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THE ILLUSTRATIVE ROLE OF
SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE
DEPARTURES IN COMBATTING
ULTRA-UNIFORMITY1-
Hon. Bruce M. Selya*
John C. Massaro**
THE CRITICISM
The United States Sentencing Guidelines are regularly attacked
by critics, many of whom wear the robes of the federal judiciary, on
the ground that they too severely constrict the discretion of district
judges and, therefore, result in sentences which do not adequately
reflect the particular circumstances of individual offenders. Put an-
other way, the complaint is that the guidelines create an undesirable
"ultra-uniformity" in which equal sentences are frequently imposed on
criminals with importantly different backgrounds and circumstances.'
We attempt to test the validity of this oft-voiced criticism by re-ex-
amining it through the lens of an underrated guideline provision, one
dealing with departures to reflect substantial assistance rendered in the
investigation or prosecution of another person. Part I briefly describes
the origin and operation of the guidelines and indicates, in a general
t Copyright © 1994 Hon. Bruce M. Selya and John C. Massaro.
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; Adjunct Professor of Law, Boston
College Law School; Adjunct Professor or Law, Boni) University School of Law. B.A. 1955,
Harvard College„f.D. 1058, Harvard Law School.
** Associate, Arnold & Porter, Washington, DC. B.A. 1989, Williams College, J.D. 1992,
Harvard Law SC1100].
3 A full catalogue of those who embrace this view would exhaust the patience of readers and
writers alike. For some exemplars, see Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure ofthe Sentencing Guidelines:
A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. Rev. 901 (1991); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in
the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 VALE L.J. 1081 (1992);
Charles Ogletree, The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 10l
HARy. L. Rev. 1938 (1988); Stephen J. Schulholer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The
Problem is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 Am. Coral. L. Rev. 833 (1992); Gerald F. Uelmen, Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: A Cure Worse than the Disease, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 899 (1992); Joseph
Weis, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines—It's Time for A Reappraisal, 29 AM. .CRtst. L. REV. 823
(1992). Guidelines criticism, while widespread (arid frequently justified), is not invariably a way
of life. In a recent survey, 91% of federal judges responding stated that they thought the
guidelines were working either very well, well or somewhat well; 51 % responded that the system
was working either somewhat. poorly, very poorly or not at all. See Don J. DeBenedictis, The Verdict
Is In, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1093, at 78-79.
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way, some areas where the discretion of sentencing courts remains
intact. Part II turns to the substantial assistance provision, elucidating
its important, and frequently relied upon, role in the guidelines praxis.
Turning from the hors d'oeuvres to meat and potatoes, Part III exam-
ines the mechanics of the provision's implementation, and notes pos-
sible areas of flexibility. Part IV singles out four of the lessons learned
in the crucible of the substantial assistance provision and argues that
they have more general applicability to the guidelines as a whole.
Finally, Part V concludes that the ultra-uniformity criticism, while con-
ceived of humble truth, may have acquired, through its near-mantric
repetition, an undeserved status as dogma.
I. THE ORIGIN AND OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES
Before turning to a more detailed investigation of substantial
assistance departures and their illustrative role in combatting ultra-uni-
formity, we place section 5K1.1 in its natural habitat.
A. Origin
For many years, federal district judges enjoyed virtual free rein
when sentencing defendants; there was no requirement that a judge
state the reasons for the sentence imposed and little oversight by the
courts of appeals. 2 As one might expect, this system of broad discretion,
in which judges might mull many factors in implementing their own
notions of justice, resulted in demonstrably disparate treatment of
similarly situated defendants. 9
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 brought about a sea of change. 4
Among other things, that Act created the United States Sentencing
2 See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) ("a sentence imposed by a federal
district judge, if within statutory IitniLR, is generally not subject to review"); United States v.
Ruiz-Garcia, 886 F.2c1474, 477 (I st Cir. 1989) ("By and large, sentencing decisions were the district
courts' prerogative. Sentences were infrequently appealed. When appeals were taken, success was
hen's-teeth rare."); cf. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1969) ("Sentencing judges are vested
with wide discretion in the exceedingly difficult task of determining the appropriate punishment
in the countless variety of situations that appear."); see also Ogletree, supra note 1, at 1940-44
(discussing history of federal sentencing).
3 See generally Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure
Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. RENT, I, 3-4 (1991)
(collecting criticisms of pre-guidelines system).
4 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(1988). An analysis of how the Act came into existence is beyond the scope of this article. Other
sources are available to slake this particular thirst. See, e.g., Kate Stith & Steve 1: Koh, The Politics
of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 223 (1993).
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Commission and charged it with promulgating a set of sentencing
guidelines designed to "provide certainty and fairness in meeting the
purposes of sentencing, i. e. , avoiding unwarranted sentencing dispari-
ties among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to
permit individualized sentences when warranted."' In the words of the
Sentencing Commission, Congress "sought reasonable uniformity in
sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for
similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders" but also
"sought proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes
appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of different
severity." This thinking produced the sentencing guidelines, which
became law on November 1, 1987. 7
B. Operation
The guidelines revolve around a grid which contains forty-three
offense levels on its vertical axis and six criminal history categories on
its horizontal axis." Occupying the body of the grid are 258 sentencing
ranges—one for each possible combination of offense level and crimi-
nal history category." In order to determine the applicable range, a
judge need only follow the user-friendly application instructions that
the Sentencing Commission has provided.'" First, the judge turns to
Appendix A of the guidelines which identifies, for a large number of
criminal statutes, the relevant Chapter Two provision for the crime at
issue." That provision assigns the defendant's conduct a base offense
5 28 U.S.C. § 991 (b)(1) (B) (1988).
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, Ch.1, PLA, intro. comment, at
1-2 (Nov. 1993) [hereinafter "U.S.S.G."; all references will be to the November 1993 version
unless otherwise indicated]. In overhauling the sentencing system Congress also sought to achieve
"honesty" in sentencing. This was accomplished Largely through the abolition of parole. See 18
U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1988) (instituting a system based on "good time" credits in which, at most,
offenders receive reductions of fifty-ibur days for every year of good behavior in prison); Pub. L.
No. 98-475, § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 2027 (1984) (repealing Parole Commission's broad authority to
reduce sentences by up to two-thirds).
7 See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Best, 17 FlonrRA L. REV. 1 (1988).
8 U.S.S.G. Ch.5, PtA.
9 Congress dictated that the high point of each range lot exceed the low point by more than
twenty-five percent or 6 months, whichever is greater. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (14 (2) (1988).
1 °U.S.S.G. § 1131.1.
II When there is no guideline expressly promulgated for a particular felony or Class A
misdemeanor, the guidelines require that the sentencing judge "apply the most analogous offense
guideline." U.S.S.C. § 2X5.1; see also 18 U.S.C. 3553(6) (1988) (setting out similar require-
ment); United States v Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150,1157-59 (1st Cir. 1993) (reviewing district court's
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level and may also require adjustments in this level to reflect the
specific characteristics of the offense (e.g., the amount of money in-
volved in a fraud or the use of a firearm in robbery). Next, the judge
looks to Chapter Three which, in appropriate instances, requires ad-
ditional adjustments in the offense level to reflect more general aspects
of the offense and the offender (e.g., the victim's characteristics, whether
multiple counts exist, or whether the defendant has accepted respon-
sibility for his acts). At this stage, the offense level is set, and the judge
must turn to the task of determining the defendant's criminal history
category. Chapter Four guides this process by assigning points to each
aspect of a defendant's past conviction record. The total of points
assigned determines which of the six criminal history categories is
appropriate.
Knowing the offense level and the criminal history category, the
judge may easily determine the applicable sentencing range by refer-
ring to the grid. The grid-range, however, is neither the be-all nor the
end-all. Recognizing that the numerical calculations mandated by any
set of guidelines might not capture all factors relevant to sentencing,
Congress left the door open for what have come to be known as
"departures"—i.e., instances in which courts, in their discretion, im-
pose sentences outside the range specified by the guidelines. [ ' The
Commission responded by promulgating several policy statements' 3
dictating the conditions under which sentencing courts might depart."
The guidelines, in other words, recognize their own fallibility. Fre-
quently, the judge must not only calculate the proper guideline sen-
tencing range but must also decide whether or not that range is
appropriate in light of the various departure provisions. [ '
decision in this regard). If there is no sufficiently analogous guideline the judge must "impose
an appropriate sentence having due regard fOr the purposes" of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b);
§ 2X5.1; see also infra note 16 (discussing purposes of sentencing).
12 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988) ("The court shall impose a sentence of a kind and
within the range [promulgated by the Sentencing Commission] unless the court finds that there
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission ....").
13 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2) (1988) (authorizing issuance of policy statements). Courts have
rebuffed attempts to suggest that these policy statements lack force. See infra notes 53-55 and
accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 21-50 and accompanying text (discussing the three major departure pro-
visions and their respective roles in the guidelines' praxis); see also THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON El'
Al.., FEDERAL. SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 752-801 (2d ed. 1994).
15 If the judge elects to depart from the sentencing range, she must provide the reasons for
that decision. If, on the other hand, the judge decides to sentence the defendant within the range
prescribed by the grid, the statute does not require any particularized explanation artless the
guideline range encompasses a span of more than twenty-four months. See 18 U.S.C, § 3553(c)
(1988).
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The last step is determining the particular sentence to be imposed.
In so doing, the judge considers a slew of factors prescribed by Con-
gress including the seriousness of the offense, the need for deterrence,
and the avoidance of unwarranted disparities in sentencing.' 6 Only
after this largely discretionary decision has been made is sentencing
complete.
As this description makes clear, the guidelines significantly curtail
the previously unfettered discretion enjoyed by the district courts in
sentencing federal defendants. But the description also indicates that
sentencing is not a matter of mere mechanics.'? The various adjust-
ments to the base offense level for specific offense characteristics and
other factors depend upon a district court's determination of what
conduct is relevant to the offense at issue—a matter inviting district
court discretion and necessitating appellate court deference to this
front-line assessment." Similarly, district court discretion is summoned,
like a genie from a bottle, by the long list of factors to be considered
in imposing a particular sentence, and by the somewhat elastic con-
tours of those factors. Finally, the departure provisions introduce play
in the joints of the guidelines structure.
II. THE UNDERRATED ROLE OF SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE
DEPARTURES
Congress specifically directed the Sentencing Commission to "as-
sure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of impos-
16 Congress lots stated than
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and charac-
teristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational train-
ing, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1988).
n See, e.g., United States v. Britunan, 872 F.2d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 1989) (specifically listing
areas in which district court discretion survives advent of the guidelines).
18 See 1.1,S.S,G. § 1B1.3. See generally William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct:
The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. Rev. 495 (1990).
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ing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed
	 to take into
account a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense."' Sec-
tion 5K1.1 sprang from this Congressional mandate. It provides, inter
alia, that "[u] pan motion of the government stating that the defendant
has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution
of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart
from the guidelines."20 While the departure provision dealing with
aggravating or mitigating circumstances (section 51(2.0) has been the
subject of much critical discussion and is widely assumed to be the
primary mechanism for introducing flexibility into a rigid guidelines
structure, the substantial assistance provision has received relatively
little attention. This Part explains why section 5K1.1 has fallen into this
rut of anonymity and why the section can be expected to move to
center stage in the coming years.
A. Looking Behind the Deceptive Pattern of Appellate Decisions
One reason for the relative anonymity of section 5KI.1, and for
the failure of commentators to trumpet its capacity for combatting
ultra-uniformity, is the case law—or lack of it—addressing substantial
assistance departures. Circuit level opinions invoking section 5K1.1 are
scattered and their numbers are paltry in comparison to the avalanche
of opinions precipitated by many of the other guidelines." More to
the point, even when courts have turned their gaze toward section
5K1.1, blinders necessarily imposed by the particular legal arguments
under consideration have limited the field of vision. The result has
been that a few oft-iterated issues dominate the section discourse,
leaving a skewed impression of the provision's potential.
The lion's share of opinions devoting any real consideration to
substantial assistance departures centers around the "government mo-
tion" problem, that is, whether a defendant's opportunity to benefit
from section 5K1.1 is dependent on the filing of a government motion
for downward departure. But the provision itself deals clearly and curtly
19 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1988). Separate provisions authorize district courts to depart below
the statutory minimum in certain instances, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988), and to depart in
order to reflect substantial assistance rendered after sentencing. See Fen. R. Qum. P. 35(b).
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, p.s.
21 As a rough example, a computerized search of legal databases reveals that, from the onset
of the guidelines to January 10, 1994, 909 published and unpublished opinions mentioned
enhancements for obstruction ofjustice tinder U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, while only 567 opinions referred
to substantial assistance and section 510.1. Results of search arc on tile with the Boston College
Law Review.
July 1994]	 COMBATTING ULTRA-UNIFORMITY 	 805
with this topic, authorizing a district court to depart only qui pon
motion of the government."'" As we shall see, courts have faithfully
followed this crystalline command and consistently barred substantial
assistance departures absent a government motion. 23 Corollarially, courts
have been wary, although not overly diffident, when confronted with
requests to review a prosecutor's decision not to file such a motion. 24
The opponents of ultra-uniformity, then, find little to like in the many
substantial assistance appeals involving the government motion problem.
Another large contingent of appeals implicating section 5K1.1
concerns situations in which the government has made a motion for
downward departure but the district court, nonetheless, has decided
not to depart. As is the case with the other departure provisions, when
district courts decide not to depart from a properly calculated sentenc-
ing range pursuant to section 5K1.1, appellate jurisdiction is sharply
circumscribed.'" An appeal may lie if there is a colorable claim that the
failure to depart stemmed from the sentencing court's mistaken im-
pression that it lacked the legal authority to do so, or, in a similar vein,
from the court's misapprehension of the rules governing departure. 26
When the decision not to depart from a properly calculated guideline
sentencing range is made while cognizant of the proper legal frame-
work, however, appellate jurisdiction will not normally attach at al1. 27
The majority of appellate level decisions dealing with section 5K1.1,
then, have involved either unsuccessful attempts to skirt the govern-
ment motion requirement, or, when a government motion has oc-
curred, unsuccessful attempts to compel a district court to grant that
22 	§ 5K1.1, p.s.
23 See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
24 See id.
°Congress sought to "preserve die concept that the discretion of a sentencing judge has a
proper place in sentencing and should not be displaced by the discretion of an appellate court"
and therefore established only "a limited practice of appellate review of sentences in the Federal
criminal justice system." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 149-50, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3332-33.
26 A party may appeal a sentence within the guideline range only if: (1) the sentence was
imposed in violation of law under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (1), (b) (1) (1988); or (2) the sentence was
based on an incorrect application of the guidelines under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2), (b) (2) (1988);
or (3) the sentence, imposed for an offense that lacked a guideline, was plainly unreasonable
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4), (b) (4). In terms of departures, a defendant may appeal a sentence
which is greater than the maximum specified in the applicable guideline sentencing range, see
18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a) (3) (1988), and the government may appeal a sentence which is less than the
minimum specified by that range, see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) (3).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1153-54 (1st Cir. 1993) (collecting cases
and explaining rationale for the rule); United States v. Munoz, 946 F.2d 729, 730-31 (10th Gir.
1991); United States v. Richardson, 939 F.2d 135, 139-40 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. dented, 112 S. Ct.
942 (1992); United States v. Castellanos, 904 F.2d 1490, 1497 (11th Gir. 1990).
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motion. The common thread, of course, is that in both sorts of cases
the criminal defendant enters the court of appeals without the benefit
of a substantial assistance departure and leaves in the same condition.
What scholarly commentary there has been concerning section 5K1.1
understandably draws its lifeblood from this happenstance, and au-
thors, like appellate advocates, have mainly concentrated their efforts
on devising a gallimaufry of normative and black letter arguments
against the government motion requirement." Put the pattern of ap-
pellate decisions together with the steady barrage of critical commen-
tary and one can begin to understand how there might be a nagging
suspicion that section 5K1.1 is a senseless straightjacket permitting
little opportunity for escape from the strict regime of the sentencing
guidelines.
It is a hard-to-swallow truth—but a truth, nonetheless—that the
pages of law reviews and West's reporters do not always reflect perfectly
the activity occurring at the trial level." This phenomenon is particu-
larly marked when it comes to substantial assistance departures. Pre-
cisely because courts in the section 5K1.1 milieu have been so unbend-
ing in demanding a government motion as a departure prerequisite,
when a district court does depart, neither the prosecution nor the
defense will often have reason to challenge the action." After all, the
defendant is not likely to challenge a district court's decision to impose
a lesser sentence, assuming it were jurisdictionally possible for her to
do so. Similarly, the government has little incentive to complain when
its motion to depart is granted. Thus, neither the infrequent appear-
ance of section 5K1.1 on the appellate stage, nor the restrictive tone
of the interpretive opinions, says very much about the potency of
substantial assistance departures as weapons in the fight against ultra-
28 See, e.g., Freed, supra note 1, at 1731; see also Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Sentencing Court's
Discretion to Depart Downward in Recognition of a Defendant's Substantial Assistance: A Proposal to
Eliminate the Government Motion Requirement, 23 IND. L. REV. 681 (1990); Philip T. Masterson,
Eliminating The Government Motion Requirement of Section 5K1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines. A Substantial Response to Substantial Assistance: United States v. Gutierrez, 24 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 929 (1991); Jonathan D. Lupkin, Note, § 5K1.1 and Substantial Assistance Departures: The
Illusory Carrot of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 CoLum, L. Rev. 1519 (1991); Melissa M.
McGrath, Comment, Federal Sentencing Law: Prosecutorial Discretion in Determining Departures
Based on a Defendant's Cooperation Violates Due Process, 15 S. ILL. U. U. 321 (1991).
29 While the filing of sentence-related appeals has escalated rapidly since the guidelines went
into effect, only a small percentage of all sentences imposed are appealed. See United States v.
Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 951 (1st Cir. 1993) (85% of guidelines sentences not appealed); Daniell
Freed and Marc Miller, Contrasting Approaches Toward Guidelines and Departures in Six Circuits,
5 FED. SENT, REP. 243, 245 & n.2 (1993) (similar).
3° Parties might, of course, challenge the degree of the departure, but district courts retain
wide discretion with respect to such matters. See infra notes 125-49 and accompanying text.
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uniformity. To gauge this potency, one must look to the front lines
where flesh-and-blood defendants are being sentenced by flesh-and-
blood federal district judges.
Substantial assistance departures occupy a much more prominent
position on this new stage. Of all the sentences imposed under the
guidelines in 1993, 16.9 percent, or approximately one in six, involved
downward departures for substantial assistance. 3 ' This record easily
suffices to crown section 5K1.1 king of the departure mountain, as it
amounts to more than twice the percentage garnered by all other
upward and downward departures combined. 32 Nor do these numbers
reflect some passing predilection. Substantial assistance departures
have exhibited a steady and consistent uptrend, occurring with respect
to 5.8 percent of all sentences in 1989, 7.5 percent in 1990, 11.9
percent in 1991, 15.1 percent in 1992, and, as we have indicated, 16.9
percent in 1993. 33 Moreover, such departures occur with greater fre-
quency in what many correctly consider to be the guidelines' mine-run;
namely, instances involving convictions for drug trafficking. in this
arena, which represents approximately thirty-four percent of all guide-
lines cases,"4 substantial assistance departures occurred more than one-
third of the time."
In short, the crop of appellate decisions and the commentary
spawned by them simply do not reflect the extensive activity occurring
at the grass-roots level. In both absolute and relative terms, substantial
assistance departures occur with great frequency in the typical guide-
lines case.
B. Substantial Assistance on the Rise
In relative, if not absolute, terms one can expect to see substantial
assistance departures assume greater prominence in the coming years.
This is because section 5K1.1 has a built-in tendency to be fruitful and
"See 1993 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP. 155-65. Reporting year 1993
covers the period from October 1, 1992 through September 30, 1993.
32 Id.
"Id.; see Daniel J. Freed and Marc Miller, Departures Visible and Invisible: Perpetuating
Variation in Federal Sentences, 5 FED. SENT. RIM 3 (1992). in 1989 and 199(1 the Commission
derived its figures from a random sample of 25 percent of all cases. In 1991, 1992 and 1993
departure information reflects all available guideline cases (for example, 42,107 in 1993).
34 See 1993 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP. 165. Nor was 1993 an
aberrational year. Drug crimes were the primary offense category in 44.3 percent of all guideline
cases in 1992, fat' outdistancing their nearest competitor. 1992 United States Sentencing Com-
mission Ann. Rep. at 44-45. Drug trafficking cases, in particular, represented 15,142 of the 36,229
cases, or 42 percent. Id. at 131.
35 1993 Utvrrt ,:n STATES SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP. 15545.
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multiply the instances of its invocation—a feature which distinguishes
it from other departure provisions whose function in the guidelines
machinery presages a contrary tendency. For example, section 5K2.0
empowers a district court to depart from the guideline sentencing
range where there "'exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance
of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by
the Sentencing Commission."" Although some would turn the spot-
light on the first part of this language, emphasizing the opportunities
for district courts to ignore or override guideline sentencing ranges,
courts have given equal weight to the latter part. Accordingly, section
5K2.0 is meant to operate as a safety valve in those less frequent
occasions where an important or extraordinary circumstance not duly
considered by the Sentencing Commission is present. 37
In other words, section 51(2.0 is not to be applied as a matter of
course by district judges. Rather, it enables judges bound by the guide-
lines to impose fair and particularized sentences even in unique or
unanticipated circumstances. Into the bargain, the section serves as a
warning bell alerting the Sentencing Commission and sentencing pro-
cess participants to areas where the guidelines may require revisions
or augmentation. Thus, district courts are obliged to provide the rea-
sons for the departures they make,38 and the Commission fastidiously
keeps track of these reasons." This is done not out of an undiluted
love for statistics but, rather, because Congress mandated that the
Commission recommend guideline refinements to respond to chang-
ing data. 4"
As statistical sources and anecdotal testimony have helped identify
and suggest methods of plugging leaks in the guidelines structure, a
number of refinements—far too many, some say—have emerged.'"
One primary and intended effect of this leak-plugging process is to
diminish over time the number of situations in which section 51(.2.0
might legitimately come into play. Thus, departures driven by this
section occurred with greater frequency when the guidelines were in
116 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)).
"See, e.g., United Slates v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347, 350-51 (1st Cir. 1989); United States
v. Nuno-Para, 877 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Palta, 880 F.2d 636, 639-40
(2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783, 786 (3d Cir. 1989); see also United States v.
Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 947-48 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining when a circumstance can be said not to
have been adequately considered by the Commission).
38 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988).
39 See 1992 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM O N ANN. REP. 20-24, 124-25.
411 See 28 U.S,C. § 994(o) (1988); see atm U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A, intro. comment.
41 See U.S.S.G. App. C (listing all amendments to date and giving reasons for their enact-
men t).
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their infancy and have decreased dramatically since that time. 42 Cer-
tainly, it is too early to place section 5K2.0 on an endangered species
list as the infinite variety of factual situations thrown up by our ever-
changing world guarantee the continuing need for a safety valve.
However, given that the guidelines are still relatively young, there may
be a continued decrease in the applicability of section 51(2.0 as rough
spots in the guidelines are smoothed over. Much will depend, of course,
on whether courts relax the standards for section 5K2.0 departures to
offset the greater specificity that the Commission, year by year, brings
to the text.
Similar reasoning applies to the other main departure provision,
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. This permits district courts to "consider imposing a
sentence departing from the otherwise applicable guideline range"
when "reliable information indicates that the criminal history category
does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past
criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit
other crimes."QS While section 5K2.0 comes into play most frequently
when the offense level, for one reason or another, fails to capture the
particularized circumstances surrounding the crime, section 4M.3 per-
forms a similar function along the other axis of the guidelines grid.'"
And, the track record of the provision has been similar to that of its
counterpart. As the Commission has revised the guideline sections
dealing with a defendant's criminal history, 45 there has been a corre-
sponding decline in the invocation of this departure provision. 46 We
probably can expect more of the same in the future, simply because
the role that section 4A1.3 was designed to play in the sentencing
process would seem to demand such a result.
42 See generally 1993 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP. 157.
43 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, p.s.
44 Each or the two provisions has been known to operate, to a certain extent, on both axes.
Thus, courts have indicated a willingness to uphold departures pursuant to § 5K2.0 to reflect
other crimes committed by the defendant (provided they are "related" to the crime at issue), see
United States v. Dawson, I F3c1457, 465 (7th Cir. 1993), or to reflect, in part, the absence of any
criminal record on the part of the defendant See United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1329
(8th Cir. 1990). Similarly, when a defendant's criminal history category is the highest on the chart
(CLIC VD, but is nonetheless undcrreprescntative, § 4A1,3 recommends that a court departing
upward determine the proper sentence "by moving incrementally down the sentencing table to
the next higher offense level ...." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, p.s., comment.
45 See U.S.S.G. §§ 4A 1, 4A1.2. Amendments in other provisions also affect the availability
of § 4A1.3 departures. For example, minimum sentences required by the career offender provi-
sions can moot the need to depart upward because of an inadequacy in the criminal history
category. U.S.S.G. Ch. 4, Pt. B (sentences for career offenders).
46 Coin/m-1011992 UND'En STATES SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP, 124-25 with 1989 United
States Sentencing Commission Ann. Rep. at 49-50.
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In contrast, the purpose of section 5K1.1 reveals it to be a rising
star. Congress singled out substantial assistance as a circumstance mer-
iting lower sentences, 47 and the Sentencing Commission responded by
crafting section 5K1.1. As the First Circuit recently noted in United
States v. Mariano, the guideline serves dual purposes." In addition to
permitting ex post sentence tailoring to reflect meaningful assistance
already rendered by defendants, the section provides defendants, ex
ante, with an incentive to cooperate in the administration of justice.
The first purpose helps to guard against ultra-uniformity in sentenc-
ing." The second ensures both the provision's popularity among de-
fendants and its frequency of use. After all, like other incentives,
section 5K1.1 was conceived out of a desire to maximize the occur-
rence of its operative condition (i.e., cooperation with law enforcement
authorities) and, as a necessary corollary, to maximize the number of
times the section would be invoked." This expansive purpose places it
in direct contrast to the more contracting function allocated to other
departure provisions.
In short, the quiet predominance of substantial assistance depar-
tures is no anomaly. The underlying purposes of sections 5K2.0, 4A1.3
and 5K1.1 reveal that the last will continue to be first, seizing an
ever-increasing slice of the departure pie in the near future. Those who
abhor ultra-uniformity would do well, then, to look more closely at
section 5K1.1.
III. SECTION 5K1.1 AT WORK
Despite the significant role currently played by substantial assis-
tance departures, and the even larger role anticipated, few courts or
commentators have essayed systematic explications of the departure
process under section 5K1.1. This Part elucidates the emerging frame-
work for substantial assistance departures and identifies areas of un-
certainty or flexibility in the section's application.
41 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1988).
48 983 F.2d 1150, 1155 (1st Cir. 1993).
49 See United States v. Vargas, 925 F.2d 1260, 1265 n.5 (10th Cir. 1991); see aLso infra notes
90-99 and accompanying text.
5° See United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1155 (1st Cir. 1993); see also United States v.
Maier, 975 F.2d 944, 998 (2d Cir, 1992) ("Congress and the Commission favor cooperation
departures."); United States v. Valdez-Gonzalez, 957 F.2d 643, 651 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992) (Fernandez,
J., dissenting on other grounds) (§ 5K1.1 is an incentive provision); Vargas, 925 F.2d at 1265
(§ 5K1.1 "designed to promote . . . cooperation").
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A. Departing
A district court considering a substantial assistance departure must
be sensitive to the operative conditions that section 5K1.1 identifies.
First and foremost, the court must have before it a government motion
to depart; then the court, like the government, must determine whether
the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation
or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. 5 '
1, The Government Motion Requirement
Section 5K1.1 requires, as an absolute prerequisite to departure,
a government motion. 52 This requirement has, to date, been impervi-
ous to attack. The fact that section 5K1.1 is labelled a policy statement
has not loosened the requirement, partly because of case law suggest-
ing that policy statements are to be accorded the same weight as
guidelines and partly because one simply cannot half-obey a provi-
sion—policy statement or not." Attempts to suggest that the require-
ment is inconsistent with the congressional directive underlying it have
repeatedly failed. 51 Courts, while acknowledging that the motion man-
5L See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, p.s.
52 See id The Supreme Court recently said as much, and, before that, the circuits had been
uniform in enforcing the requirement. See Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1843 (1992)
(referring to the "clearly correct" view that § 5K1.1 has this condition limiting the district court's
authority); United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 281 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 502 (1992);
United States v. Agu, 949 F.2d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2279 (1992); United
States v. Romolo, 937 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353, 361 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 268 (1991); United States v. Brown, 912 F.2d 453, 454 (10th Cir.
1990); United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1034-35 (6th Cir.), relik denied sub nom United States
v. Black, 1990 U.S. App. LEX1S 12858 (6th Cir, June 25, 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091 (1991);
United States v. Ortez, 902 F.2d 61, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Bruno, 897 F,2d 691,
694-95 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Alamin, 895 F.2d 1335, 1337 (1 Rh Cir.), rehk denied, 904
F.2d 712 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 873 (1990); United States v. Francois, 889 F.2d
1341, 1343-45 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1085 (1990); United States v. Ayarza, 874
F.2d 647, 653 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1047 (1990); United States v. White, 869 F.2d
822, 829 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112 (1989). The Eighth Circuit was, for a time, divided,
see United States v. Gutierrez, 917 F.2d 379, 379 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (affirming, without
opinion and by an equally divided court, district court decision to depart absent government
motion), but has since made clear that a government motion is required. See United States v.
Kelley, 956 F.2d 748, 751-57 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
53 See Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993); Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
1112, 1119 (1992).
54 See Doe, 934 F.2d at 358-60 (collecting cases and finding statute's requirement that guide-
lines reflect appropriateness of lower sentences for those providing assistance compatible with
the government motion requirement); United States v. Lewis, 896 F.2d 246, 247-49 (7th Cir. 1990)
(considering contemporaneously enacted statutes that also require government motion). But see
United States v. Dawson, 990 F.2d 1314, 1317-1319 (D.C. Cir, 1993) (Edwards, J., concurring)
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date may be "of dubious merit," have nonetheless upheld it against a
variety of constitutional assaults, finding it to be a valid exercise of
congressional control over sentencing:
Whether or not [the requirement] is wise is not for us to say.
What counts is that defendants had no constitutional right to
any "substantial assistance" departure provision in the guide-
lines beyond that mandated by the statute—so they cannot
rewardingly complain about the provision which emerged. In
this context, as so often is true elsewhere in life, half a loaf is
better than none."
The final option, amending the provision to eliminate the govern-
ment motion requirement, has also proved to be unsuccessful. 56
Until it is ushered out by Congress, then, the prerequisite is prob-
ably here to stay." This leaves three possible candidates for flexibility.
a. Implied Motions
The first possible avenue for greater flexibility deals with defining
a government motion. A number of controversies have swirled around
a defendant's contention that government actions, remarks or written
words are really government motions in disguise. But such assevera-
tions, even if triumphant in the district court, have so far failed to carry
the day on appeal. Thus, letters from the government informing the
court of the defendant's cooperation, even when held to be the "func-
(arguing that the question is open "[t]n some future case" whether § 5K1.1, which is a policy
statement, is invalid because the Commission was required to promulgate a guideline under 28
U.S.C. § 994(n)") (emphasis added).
55 United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1011, 1015 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted);
see also United States v. Shell, 922 F.2d 588, 590-91 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding section on the
basis of collected cases which considered a wide variety of constitutional attacks); United States
v. Spees, 911 F.2d 126, 127 (8th Cir. 1990) (collecting cases upholding section against separation
of powers and due process attacks); Lewis, 896 F.2d at 249 (upholding section against due process
attack); Francais, 889 F.2d at 1344; Huerta, 878 F.2d at 93; Ayarza, 874 F.2d at 653; United States
v. Musser, 856 F.2d 1484, 1487 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022 (1989).
56 Compare 57 Fed. Reg. 62,832-01 (1992) (listing, for public comment, possible proposed
amendments 24, 31 and 47 which, in various ways, would alter or delete government motion
requirement) with 58 Fed. Reg. 27,148 (1993) (not listing any of these among the proposed
amendments transmitted by the Commission to Congress).
57 COngreSSiOnai involvement in the matter is far from out of the question. See generally Orrin
G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The. United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory
Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST'
L. REV. 185, 196-98 (1993) (advocating more active congressional role in guidelines matters).
Nor is the Sentencing Commission's opposition to amending the provision in this regard neces-
sarily immutable. See, e.g., Stith & Koh, supra note 4, at 290 n.413 (observing that the President
will have an opportunity to replace a majority of Commission members).
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tional equivalent" of a motion, have not been deemed sufficient to
confer an ability to depart on the district court." A wide assortment of
statements to like effect, when made by the government at sentencing,
have similarly been construed as purely informative, that is, as a means
of providing the court with information relevant to the question of
where to sentence within the appropriate guideline range. Such state-
ments have not been treated as authorizing the court to depart if it
deems the circumstances appropriate." There is tension between this
formalistic insistence on an actual motion in the section 5K1.1 context
and the more elastic interpretation of the motion requirement in other
contexts." That tension may lead some courts to abjure the strictest
versions of the "no implied motion" interpretation. In the end, both
interpretations, and the concomitant tension between them, are rooted
in the text and commentary of section 5K1.1.°' Thus, most attempts to
fashion motions out of stray remarks or actions are likely to meet
continued rejection. The upshot: when a defendant wants to cooper-
ate, he had best get it in writing. 02
b. Reviewing a Failure to File
A second, more promising, avenue of potential flexibility is the
ability of district courts to review a prosecutor's refusal to file a motion
for downward departure under section 51(1.1. In general, there are
three grounds upon which such review may be based: (1) a constitu-
58 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 912 E2d 453 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Coleman,
895 F.2d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Baker; 965 F.2d 513, 516 (7th Cir. 1992)
(noting that "the government motion requirement cannot be met under any theory of 'implied'
or 'implicit' motions").
69 See United States v. Berke, 930 F.2d 1219, 1223-24 (7th Cir.), rellk denied, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11167 (7th Cir. May 22, 1991); United States v. Brick, 905 F.2d 1092, 1098-99 (7th Cir.
1990). Part of the reason for Otis conclusion is that the government has an obligation to disclose
information anent a defendant's cooperation so that the court may consider it in formulating a
sentence within the guidelines. See La Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1016 (collecting authorities); see also
18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988); U.S.S.G. § 1131.4; FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)(A),(B),
64 ' See infra notes 150-59 arid accompanying text (discussing majority rule in favor of allowing
§ 5KI.1 motion to do double duty by also serving to permit the court to depart below statutory
minima under § 3553(e)); see also United States v. Keene, 933 F.2d 711, 722 (9th Cir. 1991)
(Alarcon, J., dissenting) (pointing out the tension between these two rules).
61 Compare U.S.S.G. § 5K1.I, p.s. (requiring "government motion") with infra notes 160-64
and accompanying text (discussing commentary). The distinction on which courts are likely to
resolve this apparent inconsistency is that between the grounds fb• departing and the decision as
to a departure's degree.
62 See Marcia G. Shein, Get the Agreement in Writing—First: When Your Client Wants to Cooperate,
6 S.P.G. CRIM. JUST. 35 (1991); Bradley L. Williams, Practice Under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 33 RES GEsTAE 369, 373 n.20 (1990).
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tionally impermissible motive attributable to the government; 63 (2) a
government motive unrelated to the furtherance of any legitimate
end;e4 or (3) a broken promise to make a motion. 6' Generalized alle-
gations relating to these matters will not suffice to trigger further
inquiry as courts have required the defendant to make a threshold
showing before concluding that discovery or some form of evidentiary
hearing, let alone a remedy, is in order. 66
When it comes to constitutionally impermissible motives, there are
some clear candidates and some not-so-clear candidates. Refusing to
file a motion because of a defendant's race or religion surely would
subject that refusal to judicial review.° But the category of constitution-
ally impermissible motives also includes less obvious ploys, say, a prose-
cutor's attempt to penalize a defendant for exercising the right to trial
or the right to remain silent. 68 In a global sense, courts have demon-
strated a willingness to review prosecutors' decisions not to file section
5K1.1 motions when there is a threshold demonstration of either
"vindictiveness or invidious selectivity." 69 As a substantive matter, this
formulation augurs some potential for enabling district courts to re-
"See Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1843-44 (1992) (unanimous Court); see also
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608-09 (1985); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364,
reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
64 See Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, reh'g denied,
501 U.S. 1270 (1991)); see also New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam).
65
 See generally Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (holding that 'when a plea
rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said
to he part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled").
66
 See Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844 (collecting cases); United States v. Bagnoli, 7 F.3d 90 (6th Cir.
1993), petition for cert. filed Mar. 7, 1994. Although the defendant has no right to a hearing absent
such a demonstration, district courts are afforded wide discretion in their determination as to
whether a hearing is appropriate. See United States v. Delgado-Cardenas, 974 F.2d 123, 126 (9th
Cir.), amended 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32423 (9th Cir. Dec. 2, 1992); United States v. Tardiff, 969
F.2d 1283, 1286 (1st Cir. 1992).
67 See Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844; United States v. Bayles. 923 F,2d 70, 72 (7th Cir. 1991).
68 See United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1220 (3d Cir.) (remanding because district
court may not have been aware that it had the power to review government's failure to make
motion where there was evidence that such failure resulted from government intent to penalize
defendant for exercising right to trial), reh'g denied., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20322 (3d Cir. Aug.
6, 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1076 (1994); United States v. Arnparo, 961 F.2d 288, 293 (1st Cir.)
(remarking upon vast potential of this review to render government motion requirement nuga-
tory and rejecting claim because there was no evidence of such an infringement in that case),
cert. denied sub nom. Sanchez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 224 (1992); see also United States v. Doe,
934 F.2d 353, 361 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 268 (1991); United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d
455, 461-62, vacated, 933 F.2d 1042, opinion replaced on reh'g, 964 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 471 (1992); cf. United States v. Drown, 942 F.2d 55, 60 (1st Cir. 1991) (suggesting
that infringement of statutory right could also form the basis of district court review).
69 Doe, 934 F.2d at 361.
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seize discretion;7° as a procedural matter, the determination of whether
there is sufficient threshold evidence to justify inquiring into a prose-
cutor's failure to file, as well as the subsequent decision as to how to
proceed once the threshold has been met, are left largely to the district
judge."
The second ground for challenging a prosecutor's failure to file
a section 5K1.1 motion—that the decision is unrelated to any legiti-
mate end—may be more difficult to establish. The United States Su-
preme Court in United States v. Wade suggested that, so long as the
government shows it made its decision while cognizant of the defen-
dant's ability to cooperate, challenges to the decision are unlikely to
succeed because there will usually be a rational relation between the
choice and a government end. 72
 Wade resolved the circuit split over
whether district courts may effectively weigh the underlying costs and
benefits of a prosecutor's decision by reviewing it for "arbitrariness." 73
The Court said "no," making it plain that prosecutors are the ones who
determine whether a government end is actually furthered by a deci-
sion to invoke section 5K1.1, just as prosecutors are the ones to whom
the charging decisions are entrusted.
The final grounds for district court review are contractual prom-
ises; the government may not induce cooperation from a defendant by
holding out the carrot of a substantial assistance departure, and then,
having received the cooperation, renege on its promise, 74 When this
7 t) See generally Amparo, 961 F.2d at 293.
71 United States v. McAndrews, 12 F.3d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 1993) (so ruling in the related
context of Fri). R. QUM. P. 35(b), employing reasoning equally applicable to the § 5K1.1 context,
and looking for guidance to cases in the § 5KI.1 context).
72 See Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844 (citing Doe, 934 F.2d at 358, and United States v. La Guardia,
902 F.2d 1010, 1016 (1st Cir. 1990)) (government's decision may have reflected its rational
assessment of the cost and benefit that would (low from moving"); see also United States v. Doe,
940 F.2d 199, 206 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 201 (1991) (prosecutor's evaluation of
deterrence value of not departing held sufficient government end).
n Compare United States v. Amparo, 961 F.2d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 1992) (arbitrariness review
not permitted); United States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060, 1064-66 (7th Cir. 1992); Doe, 934 E2c1 at
361; United States v. Bruno, 897 F.2d 691, 696 (3d Cir. 1990) with United States v. Goroza, 941
F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1991) (arbitrariness review may be permitted); United States v. Raynor,
939 F.2d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1035-36 (6th Cir.), relig
denied sub nom. United States v. Black, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 12858 (6th Cir. June 25, 199(1), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1091 (1991); United States v. Alamin, 895 F.2d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 1990); and
United States v. Lee, 989 F.2d 377, 379-8(1 (10th Cir. 1993) (arbitrariness review pertnitted);
United Stales v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 713 (2d Cir.), CM. denied, 498 U.S. 969 (199(1); United States
v. Smitherman, 889 F.2d 189, 191 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 18784 (8th Cir.
Dec. 6, 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1036 (1990). See also United States v. Urhani, 967 F.2d 100,
110 (5th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Wade); United States v. Taylor, 868 F.2d 125, 126 (5th Cir. 1989).
74 See, e.g.. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v, Lewis, 896 F.2d
246, 249 (7th Cir. 1990).
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occurs, the defendant may be entitled either to withdraw his guilty
plea, if one has been made pursuant to the "contract," or to receive
specific performance of the government's promise."
District court discretion is at its zenith in this realm because the
court must determine not only remedies (where appropriate) but,
more importantly, a series of interrelated questions, such as whether
an agreement exists, 76 what the terms of that agreement are, whether
the agreement has been honored, and possibly, the harmlessness of
the breach. 77
 Courts have not been reticent in any of these areas. For
example, several district courts have read plea agreements to include
an obligation on the government's part to act in good faith, both when
negotiating the agreement and in endeavoring to comply with its
terms.78 This may mean rewarding defendants who provide as much
assistance as could reasonably have been expected; 79 it may mean
construing ambiguities in the agreement in favor of the defendant; 8°
it may mean ensuring that the government give honest consideration
to the filing of a motion; 8 ' or it may even mean forcing the government
to file a motion because it agreed to do so, regardless of whether the
defendant's efforts actually did assist the law enforcement effort. 82
Of course, this remediation is unavailable when the defendant has
breached the agreement, a return volley often made by United States
Attorneys accused of failing to live up to their end of the bargain.
When such accusations are traded, the district courts must examine
not only what the agreement requires of the government but also what
75 See United States v. Watson, 988 F.2d 544, 550 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied sub nom. United States
v. Camphele, I F.3d 1239 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 698 (1994). The defendent also
may have a right to discovery and/or a hearing on the matter. See generally James E. Felman,
Litigation Strategies for Substantial Assistance Downward Departures, 41 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 422,
424 (1994).
75 See United States v. Floyd, 1 F.3d 867, 870-71 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Spees, 911
F.2d 126, 128 (8th Cir. 1990).
77 See United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1499-1501 (9th Cir. 1993).
75 See United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 969
(1992).
79 See generally United States v. Fairchild, 940 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The government
should make clear its requirements for making the substantial assistance departure motion.").
See also United States v. Hernandez, 17 F.3d 78 (5th Cir. 1994).
69 See United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1340-41 (9th Cir. 1993).
Hi See United States v. Dixon, 998 F.2d 228, 231 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The government undertook
to 'deem' .whether [defendant's] assistance had been substantial, and not whether it should
withhold the 5K1.1 motion for sonic unrelated tactical reason. The government promised to
'deem,' one way or the other. It must keep this promise.").
52 See generally United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1488 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Fairchild, 940 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Laliberte, 25 F.3d 10, 14 (1st
Cir. 1994).
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it requires of the defendant, and whether he complied, or thought he
complied, with those requirements." There are interesting variations
on these themes. For example, in one case the plea agreement explic-
itly ceded complete discretion to the district court, obliging the gov-
ernment to make a motion for downward departure "in the event that
the district court found 'substantial compliance" on the defendant's
part. 84
Although the standard of appellate review in this arena is not
completely settled," there is little doubt that district court discretion
in respect to the government motion requirement is quite robust,
provided that there is a colorable claim that an agreement to file a
motion exists.
c. Influencing the Decision to Make a Motion
In practice, the government motion requirement is more flexible
than one might expect. Frequently the requirement is spoken of as
something completely within the control of the government. But this
platitude overlooks the obvious; defendants and district judges alike
play significant roles in determining whether a government motion is
made. These roles arise largely out of the fact that close to ninety
percent of all cases involve plea agreements." Defendants, through this
process, have the right to reserve their cooperation, without penalty,
until the government commits to seek or consider a downward depar-
ture;87 and, in certain situations, judges may withhold their agreement
to a plea bargain unless an appropriate commitment is made.88 More-
83 See United States v. Baker, 4 F.3d 622, (124 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
26024 (8th Cir. Oct. 7, 1993); United States v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1076-77 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 420 (1991); see also United States v. Yee-Chau, 17 F.3d 21, 25-26 (2d Cir. 1994).
"United States v. Fields, 906 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 874 (1990).
85 Compare United States v, Watson, 988 F.2d 544, 548 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Whether the govern-
ment's conduct violated the terms of the plea agreement is a question of law.") with United States
v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1076 (4th Cir. 1991) (district court's determination Of whether clelen-
dant provided assistance contemplated by agreement was subject to review for clear error). See
also United States v. Gonzalez-Perdomo, 980 E2d 13, 16 n.2 (1st Cir. 1992) (listing cases identi-
fying in-circuit tension on this point). The "contradiction" is probably a mirage. Courts will
undoubtedly resolve to review these issues as they have other contract law issues, and the result
will be a spectrum of standards ranging from de novo review kir predominantly legal issues to
clearly erroneous for predominantly factual issues. See generally United States v. Mariano, 983 F,2d.
1 150 , 1158 (1st Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1327-28 (1st Cir. 1993).
86 See 1992 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP. 56.
87 See U.S.S.C. § 5K1.2, p.s.; see also United States v. Klotz, 943 F.2d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 1991);
United States v. La Guardia, 9(12 F.2d 1010, 1016 (1st Cir. 1990).
88 See generally FED. R. CHIM. P. 11 (e)(4); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Departures aril Plea
Agreements Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 117 F.R.D. 459, 471-74 (1987).
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over, even outside the plea agreement context, a prosecutor who re-
fuses to file a substantial assistance motion when one seems appropri-
ate "may be reasoned with by the judge and, on appropriate occasions,
a supervisor may be called in."°
In sum, although the government motion requirement is strict,
the district judge and the defendant each retain some say in determin-
ing whether the requirement will be fulfilled in a given case. And once
a motion is actually filed, section 5K1.1 incorporates immense oppor-
tunities for combatting ultra-uniformity.
2. The "Substantial Assistance" Requirement
Perhaps the greatest such opportunity is offered by the section's
central requirement—that the defendant have provided "substantial
assistance.'"° After all, when a district court departs under section
5K1.1, that action, by definition, helps set apart sentences on the basis
of a particularized circumstance, namely, whether or not the defendant
has rendered substantial assistance. But the mechanisms of section
5K1.1 may also diminish ultra-uniformity in ways that extend beyond
the truistic, for ascertaining the presence of substantial assistance is
itself a process imbued with the particular.
The statutory roots of section 5K1.1 offer little guidance in defin-
ing the term "substantial assistance."9 ' The guideline itself, however,
affords some substantial assistance in this regard:
The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court
for reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to,
consideration of the following:
(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness
of the defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the
government's evaluation of the assistance rendered;
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any
information or testimony provided by the defendant;
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;
(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to
the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance;
(5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance. 92
"jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Reflections on Departures from the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT. REp. 6, 7 (1992).
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, p.s.
91 28 U.S.C. § 999(n); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988).
92 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, p.s.
July 1994]	 COMBATTING ULTRA-UNIFORMTIY 	 819
The commentary to section 5K1.1 further notes that It] he nature,
extent, and significance of assistance can involve a broad spectrum
of conduct that must be evaluated by the court on an individual
basis."" For this reason, the commentary suggests that "[l]atitude
[be] . . afforded the sentencing judge to reduce a sentence based
upon variable factors."94
In such latitude lies liberality. Each of the five enumerated factors,
and other factors related to substantial assistance which a court might
consider, has the potential to import a wide range of mitigating cir-
cumstances into the departure calculus. For example, in certain con-
texts a district court considering "the risk of injury to the defendant
or his family" might properly mete out a lesser sentence (i.e., might
decide to depart or to depart further) where a defendant has a large
number of dependents and, therefore, is exposed by cooperation to a
greater aggregate risk. 9' Similarly, several of the defendant's personal
circumstances might relate to his or her vulnerability and, therefore,
to the level of danger that cooperation imposes. These are sketchy
hypotheticals; the richly textured reality that sentencing courts face on
a daily basis invariably involves more closely intertwined facts and,
consequently, a greater likelihood that mitigating factors traditionally
thought potentially relevant only to section 5K2.0 departures also will
contribute to judicial decisionmaking in the substantial assistance
sphere. 9"
This is not to say that section 5K1.1 can be transmogrified into an
all-consuming vortex which swallows up the restrictions imposed by
other provisions of the guidelines. The section authorizes district courts
to consider mitigating factors only to the extent that they relate to a
defendant's cooperation. 97 Moreover, the section, while remarking the
93 Id., comment. (backg'd).
94 Id.
95 The section explicitly mentions "risk of injury to the defendant or his family," U.S.S,G,
§ 5K1.1 (4), p.s„ and thus counteracts, in this specific context, the Commission's general admo-
nition that "lilamily ties and responsibilities . . . are not ordinarily relevant in determining
whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range." U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6, p.s.; see
United States v. Atkinson, 979 F.2d 1219, 1225-26 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing, in § 5K1.1 context,
the fact that defendant had testified against his own brother).
96 See United States v, Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1156 n.6 (1st. Cir. 1993); see also United States
v. Gregory, 932 1?2d 1167, 1168 (6th Cu. 1991) (dicta upholding sentence where district court
had considered defendant's history of abuse as relevant to evaluating her cooperation); Felman,
supra note 75 at 423-24.
97 See Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1156; United States v. Chestna, 962 F.2d 103, 106-07 (1st Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 334 (1992); United Stales v. Rushby, 936 F.2d 41, 42-43 (1st
Cir. 1991); United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 528-29 (7th Cir,), rehk denied, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11171 (7th Cir. May 23, 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.. l71 (1991); see also United States v.
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nonexclusivity of its enumerated list, nonetheless identifies five factors
likely to be of pivotal importance in divining the appropriateness of a
substantial assistance departure. 98 Still, the district court retains broad
discretion when weighing these factors and measuring the extent of its
departure?' Moreover, these factors, along with the notion of substan-
tial assistance itself, indirectly incorporate into the sentencing calculus
circumstances likely to ward off ultra-uniformity.
3. The "Investigation or Prosecution" Requirement
Section 5K1.1 further requires that the defendant's assistance have
been rendered to an "investigation or prosecution." 100 This phrase
operates to restrict the scope of the section, 101 but, as with the "sub-
stantial assistance" requirement, it also contains the seeds of the sec-
tion's potential expansion. Thus, the requirement is restrictive because
it means that substantial assistance rendered to the justice system as a
whole will not suffice; section 5K1.1 does not contemplate departures
based, for instance, on the defendant's setting a good example and,
by cooperating, perhaps inducing codefendants to plead guilty, thereby
helping to alleviate the "seriously overclogged dockets of the District
Courts of the United States. " 1"2 Similarly, facilitating a civil forfeiture
proceeding has been held not to constitute assisting in an investigation
or prosecution."
On the other hand, the phrase "investigation or prosecution" can
encompass a wide range of activities not all of which might be imme-
diately apparent. For example, this rather general language is not
limited to instances of assistance to federal authorities. Presumably,
Hall, 977 F.2d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 1992) (arguing . that Supreme Court precedent mandates such
a result); United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 857 (D.C. Cir.) (discussing Hall), cert. denied, 114
S. Gt. 650 (1993).
• 8 See Mariana, 985 F.2d at 1156 (labelling these "the mother lode of substantial assistance
inquiries"); Thomas, 930 F,2d at 531; United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1017 (1st Cir.
1990).
99 See infra notes 125-64 and accompanying text. The court will also be given discretion by
the defendant's efforts to obtain relevant information through, for example, Brady motions. See
Felman, supra note 75 at 423.
100 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, p.s.
101 See generally Williams, supra note 62, at 373 n.20 (citing the "necessity that other investi-
gations exist" as a practical "drawback" to the section limiting its usefulness to defense attorneys).
1 °2 United States v. Garcia, 926 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1991); see United States v. Lockyer, 960 F.2d
1390, 1391-92 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (departure under § 5K1.1 for "substantial assistance
to the judiciary" not warranted).
1 °5 United States v. Sanchez, 927 F.2d 1092, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1991); see also U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1,
p.s, comment, (backg'd) (referring exclusively to a "defendant's assistance to authorities in the
investigation of criminal activities") (emphasis added).
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other forms of assistance may also constitute grounds for departure.
The section's tide and commentary support such a reading—referring
generically to a defendant's "assistance to authorities."'" And the Third
Circuit has recently held that departures are permissible under section
5K1.1 to reflect assistance rendered in the course of state criminal
investigations and prosecutions.'° 5
The question is how far this opportunity extends. May a district
court depart to reflect a defendant's assistance to private investigations
conducted by, say, his employer?' 06 Taking another tack, is there any
subject matter limitation on the connection between the assisted inves-
tigation and the crime with which the defendant is charged? And if
such a limitation exists, what are its boundaries? 117 Although cases
interpreting other guidelines provisions may prove helpful in formu-
lating answers to these questions and others like them, 108 because
104 See U.S.S.G. SKI. I, p.s. Nor does the statutory source fin- § 5K1.I refute this interpreta-
tion. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (referring only to defendant's assistance "in prosecution of another
person who has committed an offense"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (similar with respect to
district court's authority to sentence below statutory minimum).
'°tUnited States v. Love, 985 F.2d 732, 734-35 (3d Cir. 1993); see United States v. Egan, 966
F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1992), (deciding the issue sub silentio in upholding a departure based on
assistance to state authorities) cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1021 (1993); United States v. Shoupe, 929
F.2d 116, 120-21 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 382 (1991); United States v. Hill, 911 E2d 129
(8th Cir. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 501 U.S. 1226 (1991); United States v, Lewis, 896 F.2d
246 (7th Cir. 1990); cf. United States v. Emery, 991 F.2d 907, 910-12 (.1st Cir. 1993) (interpreting
similarly generic terms contained in obstruction of justice provision of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 to include
state as well as federal authorities); United States v. Lato, 034 F.2d 1080, 1082-83 (9th Cir,), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 271 (1991).
1 °6 Looking to other provisions for guidance produces conflicting answers in this case. On
one hand, it has been held that the obstruction of justice provision does not apply to private
investigations. See United States v. Kirkland, 985 F.2d 535, 537-38 (11th Cir. 1993). On the second
hand, the guidelines place a value on the success of private organizations' internal crime control
mechanisms. See U.S.S.G. 8A1.2, comment. (n.3(k)). Arguably, assistance rendered to private
investigations would also assist the "authorities" referred to in the commentary to § 5K1.1. See
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, p.s., comment. (n.2) (backg'd).
107 See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1991) ("It is routine for
individuals to provide cooperation to the government. [and benefit from the cooperation] on
matters completely unrelated to the crimes with which they are charged such as aiding in later
government 'sting' operations.") cf. United States v. Wittie, '25 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 1994) (motion
in initial prosecution did not carry over to conduct involved in second prosecution). To the
degree that caselaw interpreting other sections of the guidelines is instructive, it suggests a
requirement of some form of nexus between the conduct activating the section and the charged
conduct. See, e.g., Emery, 991 F.2(1 at 911 (interpreting U.S.S.G. § SC1.1 dealing with enhance-
ments for obstruction of justice); United States v. Luna, 909 F.2d 119, 120 (5th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam). But see United States v. Barry, 938 F.2d 1327, 1334-35 (D.C. Cr. 1991) (interpreting
pre-amendment section as requiring a much lesser nexus). We hasten to add, however, that the
value of such analogies is limited by the fact that § 5K1.1, because it looks beyond the individual
defendant at bar, plays a unique role in the guidelines praxis.
105 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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section 5K1.1 remains relatively unexplored in the appellate literature,
basic questions concerning the section's scope remain open.
4. The "Another Person" Requirement
Before a district court may depart pursuant to section 5K1.1, there
is a final requirement: the defendant's substantial assistance must have
contributed to the investigation or prosecution "of another person who
has committed an offense." 109 In other words, lending a hand in one's
own prosecution, helping to clean up after one's own crimes, is not,
in and of itself, sufficient to justify the invocation of section 5K1.1. 1 '°
A defendant's assistance, however substantial, must have had at least
the potential to "be used by the government to prosecute other indi-
viduals" before it can justify a departure."
A number of courts and commentators have suggested that this
requirement has the potential to sire sentences of a severity inverse to
the defendant's culpability. After all, this thesis runs, the larger the
criminal enterprise and the closer a defendant's links to the inner
sanctum, the more information she will possess concerning other
defendants, and, the syllogism continues, the more information a
defendant possesses, the more likely it is that she will able to obtain a
substantial assistance departure by divulging that information."'
The criticism, if voiced as an attack on the constitutionality of the
provision, must fail."' Even when construed as a policy argument, the
109 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, p.s.
11 ° See United States v. Lockyer, 966 F.2d 1390, 1391-92 (11th Cir. 1992) (defendant's guilty
plea and waiver of pretrial motions did not constitute substantial assistance).
I Khan, 920 F.2d at 1106-07. The deliberateness arid importance of this requirement are
illustrated by the linguistic lengths to which the Commission went to ensure that departures in
sentencing organizations would occur only under similar circumstances. See U.S.S.G. § 8C4.1 (a),
p.s. (requiring assistance in investigation or prosecution of another organization that has com-
mitted an offense, or ... of an individual not directly affiliated with the defendant who has
committed an offense").
112 See United States v. Apt, 949 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1991) (speaking of the - troubt [Mg] ' concern
that 'those minimally involved in criminal offenses often do not have the quantity or quality of
information that would result in the government making a motion for downward departure
pursuant to § 5K1.1 while those most deeply involved would have the necessary information - )
(quoting United States v. Reina, 905 F.2d 638, 640 (2d Cir. 1990)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2279
(1992); see also United States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Musser,
856 F.2d 1484, 1486-87 (11th Cir. 1988), Cell. denied, 489 U.S. 1022. See generally Thomas W.
Hillier, II, Congressional Oversight, 2 FED. SENT. REP. 224, 226 (1990); Schulhofer, supra note 1,
at 852-57; Susan E. Ellingsmad, Note, The Sentencing Guidelines: Downward Departures Based on a
Defendant's Extraordinary Family Ties and Responsibilities, 76 MINN. L. REV. 957,965 n.41 (1992);
Gordon Seymour, Comment, Downward Departures From the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Based
on the Defendant's Drug Rehabilitative Efforts, 59 U. On. L. REV. 837, 852 (1992).
115 See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) (offenders have no right to
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criticism is largely misguided and distorts the "another person" re-
quirement. First, it incorrectly assumes that the usefulness of a defen-
dant's assistance is the primary determinant of whether it satisfies the
test of substantiality. But, as we have discussed, a salmagundi of other
considerations are relevant. 14 The section itself identifies timeliness,
completeness, and riskiness of the assistance (to name only a few), and
each of these has the potential to operate more forcefully in favor of
minnows as opposed to "big fish." 15
Of still greater interest is the way in which this criticism exagger-
ates the "another person" prerequisite. There is no requirement in
section 5K1.1 that a defendant have been hip-deep in some large
criminal enterprise or even that he possess, at the time of his decision to
cooperate, extensive information about other felons. Rather, the require-
ment is that the defendant have provided assistance by the time of
sentencing." 6 Thus, defendants who were only peripherally involved in
an ongoing criminal activity frequently have an opportunity, after the
authorities have begun investigating them, to gain more information
by working undercover. 17 In this way, a defendant who did not collabo-
rate with "another person" in the commission of the offense of convic-
be sentenced in proportion to their respective harms), rehg denied, 501 U.S. 1270 (1991); United
States v. Horn, 946 F.2d 738, 746 (10th Cir. 1991) (collecting cases and rejecting argument that
substantial assistance requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) violates Equal Protection Clause by
disadvantaging those who are unable to render such assistance); United States v. Musser, 856 F.2d
1484, 1487 (11th Cir. 1988) (similar); United States v. Braxton, 926 F.2d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir.)
(holding similarly with regard to Due Process Clause), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 911 (1991); see also
United States v. Peters, 978 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting proportionality attack in
§ 51(1.1 context); United States v. Brigham, 977 E2d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Kohl, 972 F.2d 294, 299 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Keene, 915 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (8th Cir.
1990).
114 See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
115 indeed, it is easy to imagine how a minor participant's assistance, although providing less
infOrmation, might actually be more deserving of a departure because or the greater risk it
imposed on him and his family.
116 This timing principle which, as will be illustrated, operates sometimes to benefit defen-
dants, also means that defendants may not obtain the unguent of § SKI .1 after sentencing. See
United States v. Robinson, 948 F.2d 697, 698 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) ("Section 5K1.1 is a
sentencing tool, not a resentencing tool; thus, the sentencing judge, when faced with a section
51(1.1 motion, must rule on it before imposing sentence."); see also Fan. R. Gittia. P. 35(b)
(permitting reductions for substantial assistance for up to one year after sentencing); United
States v. Lopez, 26 F.3d 512, 520 n.9 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Martin, 25 I3d 211, 216
(4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Mittelstadt, 969 F.2d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Mitchell, 964 F.2d 454, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Drown, 942 1 7:2d 55, 59 (1st Cir.
1991); United States v. Howard, 902 F.2d 894, 897 (11th Cir. 1990).
117 See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2437 (1994); Anderson, 929 E2d at
100; HUTCHISON rr AL., supra note 14, at app. 11; U.S. DEPARTMENT or JUSTICE: PROSECUTOR'S
HANDROOK ON SENTENCING GUIDEL1NES• AND OTHER PROVISIONS OP THE SENTENCING REFORM
ACT OF 1984, Pt. V (1989 & Stipp. 1991).
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Lion can still provide assistance in the investigation and prosecution of
that person." 8 Appellate courts have held that district courts may not
attempt to interfere with a defendant's right to cooperate in this
manner."' Indeed, it has been suggested that defense counsel must, as
part of proficient representation, explore with their clients the possi-
bility of ex post cooperation leading to a section 5K1.1 cieparture.' 20
And, in appropriate circumstances, a defendant may even have the
right to defer the imposition of sentence to allow more time for his
assistance to come to fruition.' 2 '
Still, despite these weaknesses, the criticism correctly indicates
that individual culpability is not the main concern of section 5K1.1 and
that the "another person" requirement plays a role in shifting the
section's focus to issues of broader societal concern. Thus, this require-
ment serves notice that the substantial assistance departure provision
has a different aim than that of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (which requires an
offense level reduction when defendants accept responsibility for their
crimes in a timeous manner). Indeed, the commentary explicitly sets
the two sections apart.' 22 Broadly speaking, providing reductions in the
1114 United States v. Gerber, 24 F.3d 93, 97 (10th Cir. 1994) (1101 criminal conduct but, rather,
all conduct prior to sentencing was conduct relevant to § 5K1.1 departure). This point raises a
different, related criticism, namely, that the section operates to reward those who commit "group"
crimes and not those who restrict themselves to more sparsely populated transgressions. See 1992
United States Sentencing Commission Ann. Rep. at 131 (table 51) (showing that departures for
simple possession of drugs occurred only 0.5% of the time as compared to 25.6% for drug
trafficking, 31.1% for bribery, 20.1% for racketeering, and 22.2% for money laundering). Despite
the inference, this fact does not mean that serious criminals are receiving lighter sentences than
small-time hoodlums. There is no necessary correlation between the solitary nature of a crime
and its severity. Thus, substantial assistance departures have been relatively rare in connection
with relatively grave offenses such as murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, sexual abuse and as-
sault—presumably because these offenses do not, as a matter of course, involve large numbers
of participants—while departures for arguably less serious crimes, such as auto theft and wildlife
violations, occur more frequently. See id.
119 See United States v. Vargas, 925 F.2c1 1260, 1263-66 (10th Cir. 1991) (vacating sentence
and holding district court prohibition on defendant's assistance to be a fundamental error of law
which also ran counter to strong public policy reasons underlying section 5K1.1); United States
v. French, 900 F.2d 1300, 1301-02 (8th Cir. 1990) ("We do not think it is open to district courts
to frustrate a criminal defendant's desire to cooperate (not to mention the government's conduct
of criminal investigations) ...."); cf. United States v. Laliberte, 25 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 1994) (district
court's interference with defendant participation was permitted because defendant received
benefit which participation would have brought).
12° See United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 45-47 (3d Cir. 1992).
121 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, No. 93-2433, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31323, at *2 (8th
Cir, Dec. 2, 1993) (staling that. such claims will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard
at appellate level).
122
 See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, p.s., comment. (n.2); see also United Suites v. Chotas, 968 F.2d 1193,
1 197 n.1 (spelling out difference between the two sections); United States v. Singh, 923 F.2d 1039,
1044 (3d Cir.), cent. denied, 499 U.S. 950 (1991); United States v. Escobar-Mc:jilt, 915 F.2d 1152,
1154 (7th Cir. 1990) (remanding because district court might not have grasped difference).
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offense level for acceptance of responsibility helps to ensure that indi-
vidual offenders receive sentences which fairly reflect the danger they
present to society. 123 The substantial assistance departure provision
approaches the problem from a different angle; it is designed to secure
the smooth functioning of the criminal justice system more generally
and is a means of apprehending and punishing all those who have
broken the law. 124
Much of the foregoing analysis demonstrates, first, that this is not
the only function of section 5K1.1 and, second, that even in accom-
plishing this objective, section 5K1.1 indirectly promotes other goals
related to the need for individualized sentences. Nonetheless, section
5K1.1 does, to a significant extent, gaze beyond the individual defen-
dant It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the particularization of
sentences is not generally a ground directly supporting departures under
the section.
B. Degree of Departure
We turn now to stage two. Once a sentencing court has decided
to depart in recognition of a defendant's substantial assistance, it must
determine the degree of that departure and, therefore, at what point
along the broad sentencing spectrum the defendant's punishment will
fall. While the district judge is the undisputed sovereign in this realm,' 25
the precise nature and measure of his discretion remain relatively
undeveloped. Must a sentencing court follow, and make clear that it is
following, certain arithmetic steps in quantifying a departure? Alterna-
tively, is the court free to employ a more holistic approach? Is there
any absolute floor beneath which a departure may not plunge? Alter-
natively, may a court depart below statutory minima and, indeed,
forego an incarcerative sentence altogether? If precedent with regard
to other departure provisions is illustrative, there may be no unani-
123 0f course, the provision also attempts to offer defendants an incentive to speed up the
criminal justice process insofar as it applies to their own cases. See U.S.S.G. g 3E1.1(1)1(2) (pro-
viding for additional level of reduction when defendant has "timely notified] authorities of his
intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial
and permitting the court to allocate its resources efficiently"). This is nut, however, the predomi-
nant feature of the provision. See U.S.S.G. g 3E1.1(a) (referring only to defendant's acceptance
of responsibility for his offense and not to implications for criminal justice system); Id. at
comment (n.1(g)) (referring to defendant's rehabilitative effbrts); see also Chains, 968 F.2d at
1197 & n.l.
124 See United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1560 n.4 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 167
(1992) ("The Commission has not linked [section SKIM to any of the penological goals of the
Guidelines."); United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793, 802 (10th Gil .. 1994); see also supra notes
47-50 and accompanying text.
135 See United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1157 (1st Cir. 1993).
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mously endorsed answer to these and other questions.'" Nonetheless,
some guiding principles have emerged.
1. Choreographing the Decision as to a Departure's Degree
Sentencing jurisprudence has developed a dichotomy between
"guided" and "unguided" departures. 127 So-called "guided" departure
provisions are those which dictate, with some measure of specificity,
the steps a sentencing court should take in determining the degree of
a departure. Thus, when a court decides to depart because, for exam-
ple, it believes the defendant's criminal history category inadequately
reflects the seriousness of his crimes or the likelihood of recidivism,
the pertinent provision instructs that the court use "as a reference, the
guideline range for a defendant with a higher or lower criminal history
category as applicable."'" In contrast, the girding effect of the sentenc-
ing grid is much weaker in the case of "unguided" departures. These
occur when a sentencing court is specifically authorized to depart but
afforded little detailed information about how to calculate the exact
degree of that departure.
Section 5K1.1 does not fall cleanly onto either side of this divide.
In one respect, substantial assistance departures are more "guided"
than those that depend upon section 5K2.0. After all, in the substantial
assistance sphere, as elsewhere, a sentencing court is not free to con-
sider any factor it wishes when mulling the extent of a departure. The
degree of a departure must be cabined by reference to the factors that
justify the original decision to depart.' 29 And with respect to section
5K1.1, compared to its counterpart departure provisions, these factors
are very specific; the Commission has provided a nonexclusive, but still
weighty, list of five factors useful in determining "Mlle appropriate
reduction."' 3" In this sense, then, the substantial assistance provision
administers a large dollop of guidance to district courts considering
the proper extent of a departure.
126 See United States v. Emery, 991 F.2d 907, 913 n.10 ( I st Cir. 1993) (referring to contrary
views of circuits with regard to measure of district court discretion in determining degree of
departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, p.s.).
ID See U.S.S.G. Ch.1, NA, intro. comment (n.4(b)) (distinguishing ''guided" departures
from others); Selya & Kipp, supra note 3, at 11-12.
128 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, p.s.
129 See United States v. Hall, 977 F.2d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Selya & Kipp, supra
note 3, at 38-49 (same principle applies with respect to other departure provisions); United States
v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 1990) CA judge may not simply say: '1 have decided
to depart, so I now throw away the guidelines.'"), appeal after remand, 948 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1939 (1992).
130 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, p.s.
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In another respect, however, sentencing courts retain appreciably
more discretion in determining the contours of a substantial assistance
departure than when making departures under other guideline provi-
sions. Unlike the quintessential "guided" departure provision (section
4A1.3) and the prototypical "unguided" departure provision (section
51(2.0), section 5K1.1 has precious little to do with either axis of the
sentencing grid (offense conduct or criminal history). Thus, while a
district court may look to the grid for analogues when determining the
proper extent of section 51(2.0 departures,'"' and while it must do so
for section 4A1.3 departures,' 32
 the grid offers scant solace in regard
to substantial assistance departures. Rather, the sentencing judge is left
to evaluate the circumstances and situate them somewhere in his or
her own mental grid—a grid whose architecture is informed by the five
factors in the provision's text but whose more specific features will
undoubtedly be influenced by the accumulated experiences of a life-
time in the law.'"
The interplay between the guided and unguided aspects of section
5K1.1 is well illustrated by the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States
v. Thomas.'" There, in offering insights to aid the sentencing judge on
remand, the court began by using the language and approach appli-
cable to guided departures. It analogized section 5K1.1 to the accep-
tance of responsibility adjustment provision and the obstruction of
justice enhancement provision.'" Then, noting that the provisions, in
appropriate circumstances, mandated a two-level shift in the offense
level (the former, at the lime, dictating a two-level reduction,' 36 and
the latter dictating a two-level increase), the court reasoned that "de-
partures based on a defendant's cooperation with authorities may
warrant something on the order of a two level adjustment for each [of
the five] factor[s] found by the court to bear similarly on its evaluation
of the defendant's cooperation."'"
151
 See, e.g., United States v. Genty, 925 F.2d 186,189 (7th Cir.), releg denied, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4035 (7th Ch ., Mar. 12, 1991); United Stales v. Fulmer, 920 F.2d 1330,1331-32 (7th Cir.
1990),
152
 See U.S.S.G. 4A1.3, p.s., comment.
1" See U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A., intro. 4(b) (referring to Chapter Five, Part K departures as
"unguided"); see also infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text (discussing district court's unique
experience).
154 See 930 F.2d at 530-31.
135 See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (obstruction of justice); U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (acceptance or responsibil-
ity).
156 The provision has since been amended and now contemplates the possibility of a three-
level reduction. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.
t" Thomas, 930 F.2d at 531. Prosecutors too employ rules of thumb of this sort. See, e.g.,
Felman, supra. note 75, at 422.
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Standing alone, this is constricting stuff. At first blush, Thomas
appears to consign the substantial assistance section to the family of
guided departures. First, the opinion suggests that section 5K1.1 can
be given deeper meaning by analogizing it to other, non-discretionary
guideline provisions.'" Second, it invokes the talisman of mathematics,
calling into play "an incremental process that quantifies the impact of
the factors considered by the court on the defendant's sentence."'"
Finally, the opinion refers the sentencing court to the vertical axis of
the sentencing grid as a benehmark. 14"
But the unvarnished fact is that, if the substantial assistance sec-
tion bears any blood relation to the guided departure provisions, it is
at most a distant cousin. Section 5K1.1 simply does not call for such
strict formulae, and the Thomas court, as well as later decisions in the
Seventh Circuit, recognize as much. Thomas goes on to make clear that,
while the methodology it suggests has some family resemblance to a
guided departure approach, departures under section 51(1.1 have rather
different bloodlines:
[The acceptance of responsibility section and the obstruction
of justice section] provide but imperfect guidance, however,
since weighing the impact of any given factor on the quality
of the defendant's cooperation is an imprecise art, at best.
We do not intend to preclude the district court from utilizing
a scale with more gradations in order to assign greater or
lesser weight to the factors it considers.' 4 '
Here the court places the resort to analogous guideline provisions
in its proper context: it is an approach providing "imperfect guid-
ance" to sentencing courts and not a congressionally mandated
straitjacket. Here also, the court puts its mathematical incremental-
ism into context, describing the choice of a sentence as "an impre-
cise art, at best," and emphasizing the district court's role in the
process. 142 Finally, the opinion proceeds to loosen the reins of the
158 Thomas, 930 F.2d at 529.
"9 Id. at 531.
140 m
141 Id; see United States v. Atkinson, 979 F.2d 1219, 1226 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that "the
language of U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 does not lend itself easily to [a mechanistic] methodology; it simply
sets forth a nonexhau.stive list of considerations to guide the discretion of the district court"),
remanded & affd, 15 F.Sd 715 (1994) (holding that a two level departure for each instance of
participation was not required).
142 See United States v, Johnson, 997 F.2d 248, 252-53 (7th Cir, 1993) (describing Thomas'
mathematics as approximate and ruling that district court's failure to follow it does not constitute
a ground for appeal); United States v. Correa, 995 F.2d 686, 687 (7th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
July 1994)
	 COMBATTING ULTRA-UNIFORMITY 	 829
guideline grid's vertical axis by indicating that a sentencing court
contemplating the degree of a substantial assistance departure should
do so with reference to the government's recommended depar-
ture—a recommendation expressed in terms of the number of years
of immurement and not in terms of the offense level. 143
Circuit splits and judicial uncertainty have been pretty much the
rule when it comes to determining the extent of a departure.'" In
Thomas, however, we see a circuit that has a relatively "guided" frame-
work in other contexts recognizing the limits of such a stringent ap-
proach in the precincts patrolled by section 5K1.1. 145 Other circuits are
likely to agree." 6 After all, given the fundamentally divergent purposes
served by the substantial assistance provision and the Chapter Three
adjustment provisions, 1 A 7 the valtie of analogy to these provisions is
minimal; given the declared nonexclusivity of the factors listed by the
substantial assistance provision"' and the commentary's recommenda-
tion that wide latitude be afforded sentencing courts in setting the
departure amount, 149 the wisdom of following a ritualistic ratio of levels
to factors is questionable; and, given the fact that substantial assistance
bears no direct correlation to either axis of the sentencing grid, the
value of binding sentencing courts to that particular mast is infinitesimal.
It seems likely, then, that the caveats in Thomas will defeat any
attempt to over-magnify its mechanistic elements. Sentencing courts
may follow the tripartite process of resorting to analogous guidelines,
"See id.; see also United States v. Stowe, 989 F.2d 261, 263-64 (7th Cir. 1993); cf United
States v. Harris, 994 F.2d 41 2, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1993).
144 Compare United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057, 1062-64 (7th Cir. 1990) (requiring un-
guided departures to be by analogy), appeal after remand, 948 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1939 (1992); United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 685 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v.
Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745 (9th Or. 1991) (en bane) with United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d
1084, 1112-13 (3d Cir, 1990) (strongly recommending such an approach); United States v.
Lassiter, 929 F.2d 267, 271 (6111 Or. 1991); United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985, 991 (10th Cir.
1990) (en bane) with United Stales v, Emery, 991 . K2d 907, 913-14 (1st Cir. 1993) (sanctioning
the use of such an approach but refiasing to require it); United States v. Hummer, 916 F.2d 186,
194 11.7 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 970 (1991); United States v. Landry, 903 F.2d 334,
341 (5th Cir. 1990); United Slates v. Shuman, 902 F.2d 873, 877 (11th Cir. 1990).
145 See Ferra, 900 F.2d at 1(164 (setting forth strict standard for § 51(2.0 departures); Eric Lotke,
Guideline Developments in the Seventh Circuit: A Rigid Court, 5 Ftin. Sa-NT. REP. 259, 260-62 (1993)
(discussing circuit's suict standards with regard to departure sections other than § 5K1.1).
146 See United Stated v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1157 (1st Cir. 1993); see also United States v.
Martinez, No. 92-2265, 1993 U.S. App. LEX1S 27159 (10th Cir, Oct. 14, 1993) (refUsing to
examine extent of § 5K1.I departure); United States v. Hazel, 928 F.2d 420, 427 (D.G. Cir. 1991)
(§ 5K1.1 is unguided) (Mikva, GI, concurring on other grounds).
t47 See supra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
I' See U.S.S.G. §
144 See id., comment.. (backg'd); see also U.S.S.G. Ch.1, PLA, in ini. 4(b),
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developing mathematical formulae which link substantial-assistance-re-
lated factors to departure amounts, and referring to the vertical axis
of the sentencing grid as the base for making departures. But they
need not do so.
2. Absolute Caps on a Departure's Degree
We turn from the question of a district court's methodological
approach when determining a departure's degree to an abbreviated
examination of whether there are any absolute substantive limitations
on the extent of a departure. On the one hand, there is no indication
in section 5K1.1 of any such barrier;''" no absolute limitation emerges
from elsewhere in the guidelines; and it is clear that the government
may not create such doorstops simply because it is the party which sets
the swinging gate in motion. 151
 On the other hand, one must consider
the vast array of minimum sentence statutes.' 52
 In an independent
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), Congress explicitly stated that, upon
government motion, a sentencing court may depart below statutorily
prescribed minimum sentences to reflect a defendant's substantial
assistance.'" The existence of this separate and specific route for a
district court to follow, should it deem a departure below the statutory
minimum to be appropriate, has led the Eighth Circuit to conclude
that the path of section 5K1.1 was not blazed with such departures in
mind. 154
150 See United States v. Wilson, 896 F.2d 856, 859-60 (4th Cir. 1990) (upholding district court
decision to impose probation); see also United States v. Pippin, 903 F.2d 1478, 1484-85 (11th Cir.
1990).
151
 See Pippin, 903 F.2d at 1485-86 (government may not limit its § 51(1.1 motion to the line
portion of a sentence); see also United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Udo, 963 F.2d 1318, 1319 (9th Cir. 1992). OF course, this absolute principle does
not apply if the sentencing court accepts a binding plea agreement explicitly limiting the extent
of the departure. See, e.g., United States v. Cunavelis, 969 F.2d 1419, 1422-23 (2d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Mukai, 26 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1994).
152 See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 57, at 192-95 & n.8; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Man-
datory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199 (1993).
153 The statute provides:
Upon motion of the government, the court shall have the authority to impose a
sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect
a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person. Such sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the Guidelines and
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of
title 28, United Suites Code.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988).
1 " See United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 958 F.2d 1441, 1442-47 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 375 (1992); see also United States v. Baker, 4 F.3d 622, 624 (8th Cir. 1993) (adhering to
circuit precedent), reh if
 denied, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 26024 (8th Cir. Oct. 7, 1993); United States
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The majority rule, however, is to the contrary. In at least four
circuits, and arguably seven, once the government makes a motion for
a section 5K1.1 departure, the district court may depart as far as is
reasonable without regard to whether this means departing below a
statutory minimum—even a so-called "mandatory minimum." 155 The
support for this position is twofold. First, section 3553(e) and section
5K1.1 are juxtaposed closely enough, in their terms and through nu-
merous references in the commentary,' 5" that the latter should be read
as a conduit for the application of the former.' 57 Second, construing
section 5K1.1 in this fashion:
reflect[s] the proper balance of power between the district
court and the prosecution.. .. [A]lthough the prosecution is
in the best position to determine whether a defendant's co-
operation rises to the level of substantial assistance, once that
determination has been made, it is within the sound discre-
tion of the district judge to determine the extent of the
departure. [Any other interpretation] would allow the prose-
cution to ... impermissibly usurp the district court's sentenc-
ing discretion.'"
In sum, sentencing courts retain broad discretion to determine
the degree of a section 5K1.1 departure. As in other contexts, those
appellate courts which have spoken to the issue have indicated that
they will review a departure's degree only for its reasonableness.' 5"
v. Womack, 985 F,2d 395, 399 (8th Cir.) (refusing to reconsider Rodriquez-Morales despite more
recent decisions to the contrary), cert. denied sub norm, Carraway v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 276
(1993).
155 United States v. Beckett, 996 F.2d 70, 72-75 (5th Cir. 1993)1 United States v, 	 951
F.2d 490, 492-93 (2d OR 1991); United States v. Wade, 936 F.2d 169, 171 (4th Cir. 199 I); United
States v, Keene, 933 F.2d 711, 714 (901 Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Gregory, 932 E2c11167,
1168-69 (fith Cir. 1991) (upholding sentence below statutory miniinum oil basis of government's
§ 5K1.1 motion). See United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 1411 (7th Cir. 1993); see also United States
v. Padilla, 23 F.3d 1220, 1223 n.3 (7th Cir, 1994). The Tenth Circuit appears to agree; see United
States v. Campbell, 995 F,2d 173, 174-75 (10tb Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Gamble, 917
F,2d 1280, 1281-82 (10t1, (lin 1990) (upholding district coures § 5K1.1 departure below statutory
minimum despite apparent absence of § 3553(e) motion); United States v, Kuntz, 908 F.2d 655,
657 (10th Cir. 1990) (section 5K1.1 implements § 3553(e)); United States v. Felman, l8 Eld 94,
93-96 (10th Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court has mentioned, but 001 resolved, the issue. See Wade
v. United States, 112 S. Ct.. 1840, 1843 (1992) ("We are not ... called upon to decide whether
5KI.1 'implements' and thereby supersedes 3553(e), or whether the two provisions pose two
separate obstacles.") (citations omitted). The same is true in the Eleventh Circuit. See United
States v. Chavarria-Herrard, 15 13d 1033, 1037 n.6 (11th Cir. 1994).
15(1 See U.S.S.G. § SKI .1, p.s., comment.t. (n.1) (backg'd); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, co nunen t. (n.7).
157 See Beckett, 996 F.2d at 72-75; Ah-Kai, 951 F.2d at 492.
158 Beckett, 996 F.2d at 72-75; see also Ah- Kai, 951 F.2d at 492.
159 See United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1 157 (1st Cir. 1993); United Suites v. Pippin,
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While this term naturally sets some limits, the majority rule is that there
is neither an absolute lower bound on departures nor a specific meth-
odological approach that must be followed in arriving at the sentence.
C. Deciding Not to Depart
We have seen various portals through which mitigating factors may
enter, directly or indirectly, into district court decisions to depart under
the substantial assistance provision, and we have seen the latitude
district courts retain in setting the degree of a downward departure
once the decision to depart is made. Departures, however, constitute
only half the picture. The decision not to depart also carries with it the
potential to combat ultra-uniformity in sentencing—a potential that,
to date, has been largely ignored.
1. Sentencing Court's Discretion
The bedrock principle of departure jurisprudence generally, and
substantial assistance jurisprudence in particular, is that the district
court possesses the option not to clepart. 16° This avenue remains open
despite the parties' contrary agreement and the government's filing of
a departure motion.'" 1
 Thus, the government motion requirement
provides prosecutors only half a loaf of control. While a prosecutor can
largely rule out the possibility of a departure, she cannot conceive one
unless the district court agrees to play the midwife: "Put bluntly, while
a government motion is a necessary precondition to a downward
departure based on substantial assistance, the docketing of such a
motion does not bind a sentencing court to abdicate its responsibility,
903 F.2d 1478, 1485 (11th Cir. 1990); See also 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (3) (1988) (statutory basis for
reasonableness review). Indeed, lbr the most part, the beneficiary of a departure cannot be heard
to complain about its degree at all. See United States v. Doe, 996 F.2d 606, 607 (2d Cit. 1993)
(circuit survey); United States v. Gregory, 932 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6t1 Cir. 1991) (collecting cases);
United States v. Pighetti, 898 F.2d 3, 4 (1st Cir. 199(1) (holding that the statute affords no grounds
for the beneficiary of a departure to complain that the deviation should have been greater"); Selya
& Kipp, supra note 3, at 14-15.
166 See U.S.S.C. 5K1.1, p.s. ("Upon motion of the government . . . the district court May
depart ... .") (emphasis added).
161 See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 988 F.2d 206, 208 (D.C. Cir.), cerl. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431
(1993); Mariano, 983 F,2d at 1155; United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 1992);
Ah-Kai, 951 F.2d at 494; United States v. Munoz, 946 F.2d 729, 730 (10th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Carnes, 945 F.2d 1013, 1014 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Richardson, 939 F.2d 135, 139
(4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 942 (1992); United States v. Keene, 933 F.2d 711, 715 (9th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Diner, 910 F.2d 1239, 1241 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 941 (1990); United States v. Pippin, 903 F.2d 1478, 1485 (11th Cir, 1990).
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stifle its independent judgment, or comply blindly with a prosecutor's
wishes."' 62
Disappointed defendants and petulant prosecutors have at times
challenged this position by trumpeting the Commission's advice that
"[s]ubstantial weight should be given to the government's evaluation
of the extent of the defendant's assistance, particularly where the
extent and value of the assistance are difficult to ascertain."'" But
courts have turned deaf ears to this siren song, refusing to construe
this portion of the Commission's commentary as forging inroads on
the fundamental prerogative of sentencing courts to decide whether
departure is appropriate. Rather, the prevailing view is that the advice
concerns the deference a district court should give to a prosecutor's
assessment of the facts surrounding a defendant's assistance.'" Assay-
ing these facts and deciding what other facts may be relevant to the
departure calculus—matters that fall outside the prosecutor's encinc-
ture—remain essentially the district court's province.
2. Aggravating Factors
The sentencing court's prerogative to remain within the guideline
sentencing range in the face of a motion for a substantial assistance
departure introduces significant possibilities for treating different de-
fendants differently at sentencing. And since the sentencing range is
itself an expression of Congress's will, appellate courts have afforded
district judges great latitude to consider factors unrelated to substantial
assistance when deciding to forgo departures. For example, in United
States v. Mittelstadt, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the district court
had not abused its discretion in considering the defendant's chronic
alcoholism when mulling a substantial assistance departure.' 65 More-
162 Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1155.
163 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, p.s., comment. (n.3).
I 64 Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1156; Spiropoulos, 976 F2d at 163 11.5; United States v. Castellanos,
904 F.2d 1490, 1997 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Keene, 933 F.2d at 714 (observing that "the prose-
cutor is in the best position to know whether the defendant's cooperation has been helpful").
166 See 969 F.2d 335, 336-37 (7th Cir. 1992); Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1156-57; rf: United States
v. Foster, 988 F.2d 206, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (in knowingly exercising its discretion over whether
to grant 5K1.1 motion sentencing court could consider fact that offender's assistance "seems to
me to have been no greater than that of anybody else who comes here and who has a plea bargain
and agrees to testify against his cohorts"); United States v. Egan, 966 F.2d 328, '332 (7th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Carnes, 945 F.2d 1013, 1014 (8th Cir. 1991) (court could consider benefit
defendant derived from cooperating in denying substantial assistance departure); United States
v. Corozal, 941 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1991), appeal after remand, 979 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Spees, 911 F.2d 126, 128 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 664,
669 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 958 (1989).
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over, amendments since the enactment of the guidelines hint that the
Commission approves the consideration of a wide range of matters in
deciding not to depart.''
By allowing trial courts this flexibility, section 5K1.1 in effect
multiplies the number of situations in which district courts may impose
stiffer sentences to reflect a spectrum of aggravating circumstances. In
this way, the section operates to combat ultra-uniformity both when it
is invoked and when it is not. Indeed, there is an argument to be made
that this "dormant substantial assistance provision" is more powerful
than its insomniatic counterpart. In the last analysis, "the limitations
on the variety of considerations that-a court may mull in withholding
. . . a substantial assistance departure are not nearly so stringent as
those which pertain when a court in fact departs downwarcl." 167
This is not to say that a district court may consider any factor it
wishes in deciding not to depart. The Constitution proscribes consid-
eration of a number of factors, such as race.' 68 Similarly, the guidelines
bar courts from taking certain matters into account.' 69 Finally, Con-
gress and the Commission have deemed particular considerations "gen-
eral [Iy] inappropriate[]" in the sentencing context. 17°
Even so, a court deciding not to depart may directly consider a
kaleidoscopic array of offender- and offense-specific circumstances,
while as we have noted, a court opting to depart, although it may often
reflect upon such factors, must usually do so in a more indirect fashion,
filtering them through the affirmative requirements of section 5K1.1.
1 66 Compare United States v. Malvito, 946 E2d 1066, 1067-68 (4th Cir. 1991) (vacating and
remanding because district court's decision not to depart was based on self-incriminating evi-
dence divulged as part of defendant's cooperation pursuant to a plea agreement and plea
agreement restricted use of such information) with U.S.S.G. App. C., amend. 441 (amending
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8 so as to reverse the rule of Malvito, thus empowering sentencing courts to
consider all such information in substantial assistance context regardless of government agree-
ment not to use information against defendant).
167 /tlariano, 983 F.2d at 1157.
168 Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1843-44; Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1157; United States v. Drown, 942 F.2d
55, 60 (1st Cir. 1991).
16° U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10, p.s. (race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic
status "not relevant in the determination of a sentence").
170 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (listing such factors as a defendant's education, vocational skills,
employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties); U.S.S.G. Ch.5,
(adds defendant's age, mental and emotional conditions, physical condition, military, civic,
charitable or public service, and lack of guidance as a youth); see also United States v. Rivera, 994
F.2d 942, 948 (1st Cir. 1993) (referring to these as "discouraged factors" in the context of
interpreting § 5K2.0); United States v. Hatcliett, 923 F.2d 369, 373-75 (5th Cir. 1991) (vacating
and remanding sentences imposed within the guideline sentencing range because district court
inappropriately considered factors discouraged by U.S.S.G. §§ 5441.1-10, p.s.), affd after remand.
952 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1992).
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There is nothing unusual or unsettling about this asymmetry. It is part
of the warp and woof of a departure provision—a feature that helps to
set these discretionary sections apart from the guidelines' pattern of
mandatory adjustment provisions.rn
W. LESSONS FOR THE GUIDELINES AS A WHOLE
Our examination of the substantial assistance departure provision
has revealed a number of points which are not emphasized frequently
enough when the guidelines are the topic of conversation. Some of
these points, such as the fact that substantial assistance departures
occur with astounding frequency in drug-related cases or the idea that
the section bears many of the hallmarks of an unguided departure
provision, are specific to the substantial assistance context. Others,
such as the notion that particularization of sentences can occur when
a district court decides not to depart as well as when it departs, have
more general applicability. Still others, however, concern the tendency
of the guidelines as a whole to achieve particularization of sentences.
In this Part, we draw out four "lessons" of this last-mentioned genre.
A. The Power of Words
The first point deals with the power of words to constrain discre-
tion. Once one examines the specific words of a guidelines provision,
it often becomes apparent that, while containing a core meaning, the
language permits a broad measure of fuzziness around the edges. For
example, the five factors identified in the substantial assistance provi-
sion create significant opportunities for other factors indirectly to
influence the sentencing decision. This process combats rigid ultra-
uniformity, a result that starkly contrasts with the rhetoric which rou-
tinely swirls around section 5K1.1, namely that the section is merely a
tool for the near-exclusive employment of prosecutorial discretion.' 72
In this regard, the flexibility of the substantial assistance provision
is illustrative of the guidelines more generally. For example, nothing
could appear more straightforward than the guidelines' drug quantity
table which consists of six and one-half pages of lists identifying the
171 Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1157; United States v. Malvito, 946 F.2d 1066.1069-70 (4th Cir. 1991)
(Wilkins, J., dissenting).
372 See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Symposium: The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT, L. REV. 393,
n.178 (1992); Bennett L. Gershman, The Most Fundamental Change in the Criminal Justice System:
The Role of the Prosecutor in Sentence Reduction, 5 GRIM. JUST. 2 (1990); McGrath, supra note 28;
Kimberly S. Kelley, Comment, Substantial Assistance Under the Guidelines: How Smithernian
Transfers Sentencing Discretion from Judges to Prosecutors, 76 IOWA L. REV. 187 (1990).
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offense levels applicable to the manufacture, importing, exporting or
distribution of particular quantities of illicit substances.'" In fact, these
tables are far from self-implementing. First, there has been dispute
about the actual meaning of the words employed: for example, do the
weights listed in the table refer to the weight of the drug alone, or do
they refer to the weight of the entire substance in which the drug is
diluted? 174 Second, and more significant in this context, determining
which entry on the lists adequately captures the particular factual
situation of a given case has a markedly discretionary aspect. Unless
the defendant has been caught red-handed with the quantity in ques-
tion, the ballgame often will turn on the testimony of witnesses; that
testimony itself will frequently be approximate, sketching only a broad
impression of the circumstances;' 75 and, the credibility of the witnesses
will often be open to debate.' 76 Moreover, if the case involves a conspir-
acy to distribute drugs, myriad questions will likely arise about how
much of the overall operation was "reasonably foreseeable" by the
defendant.'" And the beat goes on.
In short, the hard-and-fast drug quantity table, thought by many
to be simple and precise, actually calls for the sentencing court to make
a number of discretionary determinations that can have a significant
impact on the ultimate sentence received. To be sure, in many cases
these determinations are made in the first instance by the authors of
a defendant's presentence investigation report ("PSI Report" ).i 78 Among
the risks of too much talk about the guidelines' constricting effect are
that defendants will fail to ferret out and challenge the discretionary
determinations included in their PSI Reports and that sentencing
judges will defer reflexively to those reports.'"'
173 See U.S.S.G. § 201.1.
174
 For the most part, the guidelines and case law have now answered this question by saying
"the latter." See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.I (11.1) ("mixture or substance" as used in section has same
meaning as in 21 U.S.C. § 841); Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461-66 (interpreting 21 U.S.C. 841).
179 See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 201.4, comment_ (n.2); see also United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107,
112-14 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Hilton, 894 F.2d 485, 486 (1st Cir. 1990).
170 See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 (indicating that district judges have broad discretion to resolve
disputed facts); United States v. Tardiff, 969 F.2d 1283, 1287 (1st Cir. 1992) (discussing § 6A1.3).
in See U.S.S.G. § IB1.3(a)(1)(B); see also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 6-40 (1946);
William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REA,. 495 (1990).
178 See U.S.S.C. Ch.6, PLA.
179 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, 117 F.R.D. 459, 469 (1987) (noting risk that judges would "go by the book," and "play
it safe" and "stop thinking"); Edward R. Becker, Flexibility and Discretion Available to the Sentencing
Judge Under the Guidelines Regime, FED. PROB., Dec. 1991, at 10-15 (same); Gerald Bard Tjoflat,
The Untapped Potential for Judicial Discretion Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, FED. PROB.,
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Like any other attempt to eliminate discretion, then, the guide-
lines could not do so, even were it their intention. Like some natural
phenomenon, discretion simply reconfigures and burbles up in either
the words themselves or in the attempt to apply these words in the real
world.'" This is an important point to emphasize, because anti-guide-
lines rhetoric has the potential to discourage sentencing participants
from seeking out, and seizing upon, the discretion which is there for
the taking. Courts must avoid creating patterns of abdication whereby
discretion is distributed by default to the parties who are not properly
its sole proprietors.
B. The Unique Perspective of District Courts
A second set of lessons from our examination of section 5K1.1
emerges from the disparity between the section as interpreted in ap-
pellate opinions and the section as it actually functions in the nisi Arius
courts.'"' While this divergence is especially great with regard to the
substantial assistance departure provision because of the unique gov-
ernment motion requirement, this point also has more general appli-
cability to the guidelines as a whole. As such, it contains dual implica-
tions.
First, it implies that many critics may be looking for discretion in
all the wrong places. Careful examination of the manner in which trial
courts apply specific guideline provisions, when measured against the
ways in which they could be applied, frequently reveals hidden discre-
tion. Second, and more interestingly, this disparity has the potential to
Dec. 1991, at 4-9 (same; berating attorneys For failing at times to "turn guideline sentencing
hearings into the meaningful adversarial process they were designed to be"); Weinstein, supra
note, 89, at 7-9 (stressing ways in which judges can play a more active role in sentencing and
identifying areas where judges are likely to be too deferential).
185 While most people have long accepted that any effort to eliminate judicial discretion
through positivistic rules cannot succeed completely (see, e.g., John Dewey, Logical Method and
Law, 10 CORNELL L. REv. 17 (1924); Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (Lecture I) (1881)),
there is less agreement about the degree to which such efforts can prove fruitful. Compare H.L.A.
HART, THE CoNcEvr or LAW (1961) (esp. CIL VII) (law contains broad core meanings graspable
by all and only on the outermost edges of these cores does the penumbra of indeterminacy arise)
with LON FULLER, ANATOMY or TAE LAW (1968) (responding to Hart and arguing that, even at
their "core," laws require judges to exercise discretion) and RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1978) (attempting to bridge the Hart/Fuller divide by arguing that factfinder will
have to exercise at least mild discretion in determining whether particular conception being put
Forward matches underlying ascertainable concept embodied in law). Generally, those criticizing
the sentencing guidelines have lost sight of this fundamental debate or assumed that the guide-
lines somehow stand immune from the lung-established lesson that positivism cannot succeed
completely.
181 See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
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become a nesting place for the discretion-granting notion that sentenc-
ing courts have a unique perspective on the guidelines and, as a result,
develop a level of expertise which both the Commission and appellate
courts should recognize when performing their respective roles in the
guidelines pavane.
The First Circuit's recent decision in United Stales v. Rivera illus-
trates this latter point.' 82 That opinion carved out an area for the
exercise of district court discretion in considering the propriety of
section 5K2.0 departures. The court held that appellate panels should
be wary of interfering with a district court determination of whether
a case is sufficiently outside a section's heartland to merit a departure.
The court first reasoned that district courts view the facts of given cases
from a front-lines vantage point and, as a result, they are better equipped
than an appellate court to evaluate whether a case is "unusual." Sec-
ond, the court indicated that district courts are "likely to have seen
more ordinary Guidelines cases, while appellate courts hear only the
comparatively few cases that counsel believe present a colorable ap-
peal."'"
This second point, whispered with ever-increasing frequency in
one form or another, is a potential foot in the door for sentencing
court discretion. It rests upon the explicit assumption that, as an
institutional matter, district courts have something to teach both the
Commission and the appellate courts about the real meaning of the
terms employed in the guidelines. As such, it need not be restricted to
the departure context. For instance, the idea that sentencing judges
may, as a rule, have much "experience with the mainsprings of human
conduct" has been used to underpin the deferential review afforded
role-in-the-offense determinations.'"
182 994 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1993). The primary focus of the opinion is to spell out in more
detail the distinction between the first branch (de novo review) and the second branch (clear
error review) of the tripartite standard of review framework for § 5K2.0 departures limned in the
circuit's seminal opinion of United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 862 (1989). See alsoSelya & Kipp, supra note 3, at 18-22 (fleshing out framework
and surveying approach of other circuits, most of which have either explicitly or implicitly
adopted Diaz- Viilafane's approach).
183 Rivera, 994 F.2d at 951 (citing statistic that 85% of guidelines sentences are not appealed).
184 United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 444 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 562 (1988) (deferential appellate review appropriate where a statute's proper
application is a "question ... likely to profit from the experience that an abuse-of-discretion rule
will permit to develop")); see also Aaron Rappaport, Guideline Developments in the First Circuit:
The Two Faces of Appellate Review, 5 Fan. SENT. REP. 267, 269 (1993); Charles P. Sifton, Theme
and Variations, 5 Frio. SENT. REP. 303, 304 (1993) (introducing special issue of Federal Sentencing
Reporter devoted to district court ability to take into consideration local conditions when breath-
ing meaning into guidelines, and stating that "[c]onfrontation with large numbers of offenders
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Of course, the principle has its limits. District court "expertise"
may alert the Commission to guidelines provisions which require re-
pairs or renovations, but, if such "expertise" is to be employed in
specific cases to alter actual sentences, the usage will be sustained on
appeal only if it has operated within the meaning of the then-extant
guidelines. In other words, there is space for district court "expertise,"
but not wide-open space; the surrounding walls are solid.
Two pre-Rivera opinions evaluating section 51(2.0 departures that,
in turn, reflected local circumstances known by the district judge,
illustrate the proper scope of district court "expertise." In United States
v. Big Crow, the Eighth Circuit held that the guidelines permitted a
downward departure to reflect the fact that the defendant, who lived
on an Indian reservation where the unemployment rate was seventy-
two percent and the per capita annual income was $1,042, had an
excellent employment history, solid community ties and a consistent
history of "efforts to lead a decent life in a difficult environment." 185
In United States v. Aguilar-Pena, by contrast, the First Circuit held that
the district court could not justify an upward departure on the basis of
its impression that the drug smuggling engaged in by the defendant
was particularly distasteful to Puerto Rico and its inhabitants.' 86
Here lies the key to the appropriate sweep of district judge "ex-
pertise." The essential difference between Big Crow and Aguilar-Pena
is the nexus between the judge's knowledge of local conditions and
the individual defendant. In the former case, the judge used his special
knowledge to evaluate the particular defendant—a defendant whom
the Sentencing Commission could not have known and whom the
appellate courts would only know through an algid record. By contrast,
in Aguilar-Pena the district judge's knowledge of local conditions was
employed as a way of evaluating the proper punishment for any person
who committed the crime in question—just the sort of matter that the
Sentencing Commission, and Congress, would normally consider. Put
another way, in Big Crow, the defendant and the circumstances of his
crime were set apart from others that had come before the judge; in
Aguilar-Pena, the opposite was true. In short, the "expertise" involved
in Aguilar-Pena did not merit deference because it was employed to
make a categorical departure that had equal pertinence to an entire
may give a local judge a greater appreciation of the relative roles of offenders"); Stith & Koh,
supra note 4, at 246-47 (collecting authorities and implicitly discussing theory of district court
"expertise" in context of § 51(2.0).
185 United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (8th Cir. 1990).
186 United States v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347, 351-53 (1st Cir. 1989).
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class of cases while the "expertise" involved in Big Crow was correctly
employed in an offender-and-offense- specific fashion.
The lesson is that, just as the disparity between the guidelines as
they appear at the appellate level and the guidelines as they appear
elsewhere is not something confined to section 5K1.1, neither is the
discretion-granting principle of deference to district court "expertise"
that emerges from this fact so confined. In future years, this area,
though it has some natural limits, is one that bears watching.
C. The Guidelines Under Construction
Another lesson growing out of our examination of section 5K1.1
deals with the importance of recognizing the guidelines' ability to
change over time. In our consideration of the purposes of the various
departure provisions, we have seen that the amendment process has
implications for the future role of section 5K1.1 vis-a-vis sections 5K2.0
and 4A1.3.' 87 We have also seen that both Congress and the Commis-
sion conceived of the amendment process as a crucial vehicle allowing
the guidelines to evolve in response to feedback from district judges
and others.' 88 The first, more localized lesson and the second, more
general lesson, each has implications for those who seek to combat
ultra-uniformity.
We begin with the localized implication. To date, the strategy of
many litigators and commentators who oppose ultra-uniformity has
rested on two assumptions: (1) that section 5K2.0 and section 5K1.1
are enmeshed in something like a zero-sum battle; and (2) that the
goal of desirable disparity would be better realized if section 5K2.0 won
this battle. The first assumption has a certain force. Every articulated
ground for departure which the judiciary construes as falling within
the contemplated scope of section 5K1.1 automatically becomes less
eligible, although not entirely ineligible, as a basis for a section 5K2.0
departure.'" Thus, the fact that section 5K1.1 permits district courts
187
 See supra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
188 See id.
18g
 See generally United States v. Agu, 949 F.2d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1991) (court would be particu-
larly unlikely to permit departures from procedural requirements, such as government motion
requirement, even where it could be said that a factor, such as assistance, was present to a degree
not adequately considered by Commission); United States v. Khan, 920 F.2(1. 1100, 1106-07 (2d
Cir. 1990) (Commission clearly considered situation where defendant cooperates; only excep-
tion" is where defendant shows evidence of assistance "which could not be used by the govern-
ment to prosecute other individuals ... but which could be construed as a 'mitigating circum-
stance"), cert. denied, 499 U.S. at 969 (1991); United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 115 (1st Cir.
1990) (noting that "'because the guidelines addressed departures for substantial assistance in
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to consider in their departure calculus "any injury suffered, or any
danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from
his assistance"'" means that such circumstances were considered by the
Commission. This, in turn, makes it more difficult for them to serve
as the basis for a mitigating circumstances departure."' Conversely, the
fact that a defendant's assistance to the judicial system as a whole is
not contemplated by section 5K1.1 as a possible ground for departure
implies that it can, in certain circumstances, justify a departure under
section 5K2.0)"
The second assumption—that it is best to contract section 51(1.1
and expand the swath of section 5K2.0—derives largely from the ques-
tionable perception that section 5K1.1 lacks the potential for wide
applicability. The statistics and other evidence we have identified have
cut much of the ground from beneath this second assumption by
revealing that section 5K1.1 already has wide applicability)" Whatever
justifications remain for this assumption are refuted by the effect of
the amendment process on the respective provisions; the evolutionary
aspect of the guidelines ensures that section 5K1.1, already the pre-
ferred vehicle for departures, is gaining popularity. The upshot is that
those who. seek to reduce ultra-uniformity would be well advised to
identify methods of expanding the applicability of substantial assis-
tance departures, rather than putting all their eggs in the section 5K2.0
basket.
The more general point that stems from this discussion is that the
evolutionary system contemplated by Congress and implemented by
the Commission can be a very powerful tool if participants do their
best to let it function as designed."' Three recent amendments illus-
section SKI .1, departures for the same reason cannot he sustained under the generic [departure
provisions of the guidelines],' at least in an ordinary case") (quoting United States v. La Guardia,
9{}2 F.2d 1010, 1017 n.6 (1st Cir. 1990)); see atso United States v. Dawson, 990 F.2d 1314, 1317
(D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Aslakson, 982 F.2d 283, 284 (8th Cir, 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
0, 1875 (1993); United States v. Chotas, 968 F.2d 1193, 1195 (11th Cir. 1092); United States v.
Goroza, 941 17.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Bruno, 897 F.2d 691, 695 (3d Cir.
1990); United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1989); ef United States v. Higgins, 9(17
F.2d 841, 845 (3d Cir. 1992) (implying that substantial assistance could serve . as basis tin- 51(2.0
departure in some special circumstances), reh'g denied, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 16316 (3d Cirjuly
17, 1992).
196 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (a) (4), p.s.
191 See United States v. Mason, 966 F.2d 1988, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
192 United States v. Garcia, 926 F.2d 125, 127-28 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United States v, Baker,
4 F.3d 622, 624 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Khan, 920 F2d 1100, 1106-07 (2d Cir. 1990),
195 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
1 • 4 See generally Donald P. Lay, Rethinking the Guidelines: A Call for Cooperation, 101 YALE
1755 (1992).
842	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 35:799
trate this proposition. The Commission drafted the first amendment
to meet well-founded criticism that the guidelines often punished
"mules" (persons who transport contraband for sizable drug opera-
tions) too severely because of the composition and impact of the drug
quantity table.'" The amendment explicitly authorizes downward de-
partures in some of these instances.'" A second amendment responds
to the emerging issue of sentencing factor manipulation—a process by
which the government intentionally structures a sting operation with
the guidelines in mind, thus maximizing a defendant's ultimate sen-
tence.' 97 The new law permits downward departures upon a showing
that the government intentionally induced the defendant to purchase
a greater drug quantity than he otherwise might have by setting a price
below market value.'" The final amendment was in response to the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Chapman v. United Statesm and the
popular reaction that decision produced.m The amendment alters the
way quantities of LSD are measured for sentencing purposes so as to
limit the effect of carrier media, such as blotter paper, on the ultimate
sentence.m
These amendments make clear that departures—a favorite focal
point of those considering how to make the guidelines more sensitive
to relevant differences among offenders and offenses—are not the
exclusive method for combatting ultra-uniformity. In the long run,
active involvement in the Commission's amendment process by inter-
ested on-lookers can improve the guidelines and make them more
sensitive to individual differences.
195 See, e.g., United Suites v. Valdez-Gonzalez, 957 F.2d 643, 649-50 (9th Cir. 1992); Memoran-
dum, 5 FED. SENT. REP. 298 (1993) (reproducing letter from Judge Weinstein announcing his
decision to decline further consideration of drug cases partially on this ground).
196 See 58 Fed. Reg, 27,148, 27,154-55 (1993) (proposed amendment number 11) (enacted
at U.S.S.G. § 201.1, comment (n.16)).
117 See generally United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 194-97 (1st Cir. 1991) (discussing
sentencing factor manipulation); United States v. Castiello, 915 E2d 1, 5 n.10 (1st Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1068 (1991).
196 See 58 Fed. Reg. 27,148, 27,155 (1993) (proposed amendment number 13) (enacted at
U.S.S.G. § 201.1, comment. (n.17)).
PI' See Chapman v. United States, 111  S. Ct. 1919, 1929 (holding that the term "mixture or
substance" in 21 U.S.C, § 841 (b) (1) includes carrier medium in which LSD is absorbed), reh'g
denied, 112 S. Ct. 17 (1991).
2()" See, e.g., Linda Himelstein & Eva M. Rodriguez, Panel Approves More Leeway in Drug
Sentencing: First Step to Broad Reassessment?, LEGAL TIMES, May 26, 1993, at 2; Jim Newton, Long
LSD Prison Terms ... Its All in the Packaging, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 1992, at Al,
591 See 58 Fed. Reg. 27,148, 27,155-56 (1993) (proposed amendment number 14) (enacted
at U.S.S.G. 201.1(c)).
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D. The Double-Edged Effect of Individualized Sentences
Much of the persuasive punch packed by the critics of ultra-uni-
formity comes from the Orwellian images their criticism evokes. In
most people's minds, individuality and individualized treatment are
desirable, and squeezing defendants' situations into boxes of a grid
appears dehumanizing and narrow-minded. Using section 5K1.1 as an
example, we have attempted to illuminate many of the ways in which
a defendant's sentence can be individualized within the confines of the
guidelines. But even if one accepts the notion that the guidelines have
decapitated (if not decimated) the body of discretion previously re-
posed in the sentencing courts—and it is difficult not to credit that
idea to some degree—the conclusion that sentencing has become
overly harsh or dehumanizing does not necessarily follow.
First, there is the obvious; a certain measure of uniformity furthers
the goal of fairness rather than undermining it. 202 This was, after all, a
major impetus for the guidelines, 203 and the limits reflected in the
guidelines are intended, in part, to safeguard defendants from arbi-
trary sentences based on regional differences or judges' personal idi-
osyncrasies. 2" Second, to the degree that sentencing rules do not leave
room for an unfettered district court focus on a defendant's individual
culpability, they are a double-edged sword. 205 The defendant-harming
side of this sword is evident; the guidelines seem to punish relatively
minor first-time offenders on the periphery of narcotics rings, for
example, with undue severity because of the drug quantities handled
by the ring, as if to sacrifice the individual for the greater good of
society's war on drugs. Less exposed is the defendant-benefitting side
of this sword. Section 5K1.1 is cast in this mold. It peers beyond the
individual defendant's culpability to the broader societal concern fur-
"2 See, e.g., United States v. Seluk, 873 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
203 See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, 65, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221;
see also 18 U.S.G. § 3553(a) (6) (1988); Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d at 352.
204 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 376 (1989); United States v. La Guardia, 902
F.2d 1010, 1014 (1st Cir. 1990).
205
 Each edge of the sword reflects a policy concern. There is no constitutional requirement
of individualized sentencing. See, e.g., Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (stating that
"in noncapital cases, the [then] established practice of individualized sentences rests not on
constitutional commands, but on public policy enacted into statutes"); La Guardia, 902 F.2d at
1014 (collecting cases and holding that "Congress has the power to cabin judicial sentencing
discretion, or even to eliminate discretion entirely, by fixing precise rather than indeterminate
sentences"); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89-90 (1986); United States v. Grayson,
438 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1978); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970); Ex parte United States,
242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916).
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nishing incentives for productive cooperation with law enforcement
initiatives."6
 Section 5K1.1 is illustrative of the non-individualistic con-
cern of the guidelines in another respect as well. In determining the
exact sentence, judges are commanded to consider factors such as the
need for deterrence and the yen to provide victims with restitution."'
These non-individualistic factors have the capacity to cut in favor of
defendants as well as against them."
Finally, our investigation of section 5K1.1 reveals that the guide-
lines leave defendants with significant opportunities to participate in
the sentencing process and influence its outcome. Thus, for example,
a defendant has some control over whether, and with what degree of
force, the section will come into play. For the most part, a defendant
voluntarily decides whether he will provide assistance; he voluntarily
determines many of the attributes which comprise the substantiality of
his assistance, such as its timing and degree; and, he may insist that
any plea agreement contain a clause either obligating the government
to move for a substantial assistance departure or imposing some less
stringent, but related, obligation on the government to move for a
departure should certain criteria be satisfied. In short, even if one views
section 5K I .1 as hampering the district court's discretion to depart,
this view does not translate directly into restrictions on a defendant's
ability to obtain a departure. In sum, the section is not a mechanism
for the wholesale transfer of discretion from the district court to the
prosecution.
A similar principle can be seen at work throughout the guidelines.
To pick one example, a defendant may play a role in insuring himself
a reduced offense level by complying with the requirements set out in
the acceptance of responsibility section."Ex ante, a criminal can, with
some degree of specificity, cabin his exposure to penal liability by
structuring his activity to avoid certain guideline trouble areas:210 In
other words, even if the certainty and objectivity of the sentencing
guidelines effectively deprive district courts of considerable discretion,
some of that lost discretion passes into the hands of defendants, em-
powering them and diminishing somewhat the rhetorical force of the
ultra-uniformity criticism.
"6 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
2In
 See 18 U.S.C.. § 3553(a).
2°11 Cf. Rivera, 994 F.2d at 954-56 (discussing district court's decision to depart downward on
the ground that defendant could not provide restitution while languishing in jail).
§ 3E1.1.
210 In many ways, this observation concerns the flip side of the sentencing factor manipula-
tion cases. See supra notes 197-98.
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V. CONCLUSION
We have attempted, in this short space, to perform two tasks. First,
this article examines in some detail section 5K1.1, a guideline provision
which promises to gain increasing importance in the years to come.
Although section 5K1.1's provisions are not self-implementing  and its
jurisprudence, with one area of exception, is relatively scant, a number
of guiding principles and "how to" instructions have emerged. We
have, where possible, catalogued them. Second, this article tests, in the
laboratory of a specific guidelines provision, the argument against
ultra-uniformity. We conclude that, in many ways, it is a correct argu-
ment, that, in many ways, it is right to make the argument, but also
that, in certain respects, the argument is hyperbolic. To that extent, it
is wrong.
